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I. INTRODUCTION
"Proposition 218 is the worst piece of legislation ever drafted."'
No statement-and indeed, there have been man ,-can better sum up the
frustration among the political establishment for the latest manifestation of
California's tax reform movement. Passed in November 1996, Proposition 218
effectively prevents local governments from levying special assessments without the
consent of affected property owners. In doing this, Proposition 218 overturns a line
of California cases which held that the tough tax limitation and voter approval
requirements of Proposition 132 did not apply to such assessments. This has resulted
in what the California State Association of Counties calls "the most revolutionary
act in the history of California."3
Proposition 218 specifies that all assessments must be approved by property
owners through majority protest proceedings.4 These proceedings allow only pro-
perty owners to vote on special assessments; those who lease property have no say.'
In addition, each property owner receives a vote based on the amount of property
he or she owns.' These proceedings, gross manipulations of similar majority protest
devices under the traditional law of special assessments,7 are the centerpiece of the
initiative's new requirements. Of these provisions, an editorial of the Los Angeles
Times asks, "[a]re we back to the days of the landed gentry, or maybe the city-state
kingdoms and lowly serfs?"8
Proposition 218 narrowly confines the assessment power of local governments
by reining in the concept of special benefits.9 This concept, specifying that property
may only be assessed for the tangible benefits that accrue to property from public
improvements, is employed under Proposition 218 on a strict, proportional basis.'"
In contrast to the traditional law of special assessments, the portion of any improve-
ment which benefits the public in addition to the affected property must now be
derived from some revenue source other than the assessment."
1. Scott Barnett. Overtaxed: When a Tax Masquerades as an Assessment ... Cities Seek to Elude
Requirement for a Vote of Electorate When Raising Money, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 19, 1997, at GI.
2. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (explaining the provisions of Proposition 13).
3. 1 KENNETH A. EHRMAN & SEAN FLAVIN. TAXING CALIFORNIA PROPERTY, at iii (3d ed. Supp. 1997).
4. See infra Part V.B.2 (explaining these proceedings).
5. See infra Part V.B.2 (describing the provisions of Proposition 218 pertaining to who may vote in
assessment proceedings).
6. See infra Part V.B.2 (noting that property owners vote in proportion to their financial obligation under
Proposition 218).
7. See infra Part m.C.3 (explaining majority protest proceedings under the traditional law of special
assessments).
8. Califonmia Serfdom: Prop. 218 Unfairly Shifts Voting Power to Favor the Landed Gentry, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 1997, at B6.
9. See infra Part V.A (discussing the changes to the special benefits justification).
10. See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text (detailing the proportional benefits requirement imposed
by Proposition 218).
11. See infra 189-91 notes and accompanying text (discussing this requirement).
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Proposition 218 makes other changes, including new notice requirements and
a shifted burden of proof in legal actions contesting special assessment deter-
minations. 2 In sum, Proposition 218 radically departs from traditional special
assessment law.
The purpose of this Comment is twofold. First, this Comment compares and
contrasts the law of special assessments before and after Proposition 218.13 Second,
this Comment explores the issue raised during the campaign that the assessment
provisions of Proposition 218 violate the One-Person, One-Vote equal protection
doctrine by limiting approval of assessments to only property owners.14 As back-
ground for both of these issues, this Comment seeks to place Proposition 218 in its
proper legal and historical context by explaining Proposition 13, the predecessor
of Proposition 218 and hallmark of the California "tax revolt" movement, and the
line of cases which held that the tough provisions of Proposition 13 did not apply
to special assessments."
II. PROPOSITION 218 IN CONTEXT: AFTER TWENTY YEARS, THE TAX REVOLT IN
CALIFORNIA IS ALIVE AND WELL
A. The Continuing "Revolution"
Proposition 218 simply cannot be explained without first understanding its pre-
decessor, Proposition 13. Passed by an overwhelming majority in 1978, Proposition
13 sought to strictly limit the taxing power of government. The landmark initiative
took a revolutionary approach that both fundamentally changed the way govern-
ment operated and radically altered the relationship between taxpayers and their
government, As stated by a joint legislative budget committee report convened to
review the landmark initiative ten years after its passage, "Proposition 13 was pro-
bably the single most significant change made in the way governments, at all levels,
operate in California."' 6
When Proposition 13 appeared on the ballot, voters were particularly concerned
about excessive and wasteful government spending, 7 an unwarranted expansion in
12. See infra Part V.B.I, V.C (setting forth these changes).
13. See hifra Part III (illustrating the traditional law of special assessments); Part V (explaining special
assessment law under Proposition 218).
14. See infra Part VI (analyzing Proposition 218 under the One-Person, One-Vote Doctrine and concluding
that the initiative is constitutional).
15. See infra Part II (describing Proposition 13): Part IV (explaining case law holding that Proposition 13 did
not apply to special assessments).
16. JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMITTEE, PROPOSITION 13. TEN YEARS LATER 2 (1987) [hereinafter
PROPOSITION 13, TEN YEARS LATER].
17. In the 1978 California Voter Pamphlet, the proponents of Proposition 13 made the claim that 15% of all
governmental spending was wasted. SECRETARY OF STATE. JUNE. 1978 CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET 58
[hereinafter 1978 VOTER PAMPHLET]. As examples of governmental waste, proponents cited huge pensions for
governmental officials and the use of limousines by elected officials. Id. Accordingly, they argued that Proposition
13 presented the voters with a chance to "trade waste for property tax relief!" id.
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government programs and regulation,' 8 and shrinking real incomes consumed by
inflation and progressive income taxes.' 9 Even more important than these factors,
however, was the concern about the rapid escalation of tax burden on property
owners within the state. 20 In the decade-and-a-half prior to Proposition 13, tax rates
in the state increased by 51%, property taxes collected more than quadrupled, and
the assessed values of property tripled.2' The effect of this upward trend on home-
owners was debilitating.' Some could no longer afford to stay in their homes.'
Senior citizens, in particular, were among those hardest hit as rising property tax
burdens cut into their fixed retirement incomes.24
These conditions, coupled with the inadequacy of the political establishment
to respond with effective relief,' laid the foundation for the property tax revolt in
California.26 Under the prevailing economic conditions, the prospects for tapping
into voter discontent were enormous. As a result, Proposition 13 passed by nearly
a two-thirds margin."
In retrospect, the effects of Proposition 13 have resonated well beyond the
fundamental change it enacted in California's property tax system. Today, the
initiative is viewed as the dawning of a nationwide movement, one that has called
into question the role of government itself. Proposition 13 ushered in a new era of
anti-government sentiment which empowered citizens "to not only complain about
their taxes, but to do something about them. It redefined the relationship between
taxpayers and government."'
This observation finds support in both statistics and anecdote. A Field Poll
conducted one year prior to the passage of Proposition 13 found that the public
believed that high taxation was the number one problem faced by the state and its
communities."9 Similarly, another poll conducted during this period found that
18. The ballot statements in favor of Proposition 13 argued that the initiative was needed to stop businesses
from leaving the state and to make the state more attractive to new businesses. Id. at 59.
19. 1 EHRMAN & FLAVIN.supra note 3. § 2:0 1, at 2. The ballot statement in favor of Proposition 13 argued
that passage of the initiative would prevent spendthrift politicians from taxing Californians into poverty. 1978 VOTER
PAMPHLET, supra note 17, at 59.




24. A spokesman for the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association notes that "'[tlo this day, we get calls from
[an) 88-year-old widow who sends us $5 every year and says, 'If it wasn't for Prop. 13. I would lose my home."' Joe
Martin, Things Fall Apart. SACRAMENTO NEWS & REV.. Nov. 6, 1997, at 17 (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
25. In response to Proposition 13. the state legislature put forth its own version of property tax reform with
Proposition 8, which would have allowed local governments to tax residential property at lower rates than other types
of property. This competing measure gained the widespread approval of the political establishment, garnering the
official support of the Republican and Democratic parties, labor unions, teacher associations and many other groups.
I EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 3, § 2:02, at 4. Proposition 8 did not pass despite such wide-ranging support. Id.
26. Id. § 2:01. at 2-3.
27. Peter Schrag. A Dubious Proposition: 20 Years Later, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 5, 1998, at Forum 2-3.
28. This is the statement of Assemblyman Bill Leonard. Martin, supra note 24. at 15.
29. PROPOSITION 13. TEN YEARS LATER, supra note 16. at 2.
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respondents, by a two-to-one margin, believed that government should be smaller
and should provide fewer services."0 As for anecdotal knowledge, a supporter of
Proposition 13 stated it best: "Ronald Reagan would not have been president, nor
would the national ascendency of conservative politics have been possible without
Proposition 13."3' It is noteworthy that the property tax revolt preceded the so-
called "Reagan Revolution" by only two years.
The passage of Proposition 218 some twenty years after the events that led up
to Proposition 13 demonstrates that support for the landmark anti-tax initiative
remains strong. Because California courts created "loopholes" in Proposition 13
that allowed politicians to "[c]all taxes 'assessments' and 'fees,"' 32 Proposition 218
was drafted to provide a means of restoring the "right" to vote on taxes that had
been eroded by judicial interpretation.33 Proposition 218 was a counter-strike
against the political establishment and "activist" judges who had twisted the intent
of the people by creating devices to circumvent Proposition 13's tough anti-tax
restrictions. By approving Proposition 218, the voters, in effect, reaffirmed
Proposition 13.
To garner the support of voters, supporters of Proposition 218 kept their
message simple. They counseled voters to ask themselves whether they "SHOULD
HAVE THE RIGHT TO VOTE ON TAXES? If you answered 'yes,' VOTE YES
ON PROPOSITION 218."' Consistent with this message, the initiative itself was
even dubbed the "Right to Vote on Taxes Initiative." This message, despite its
obvious political appeal, showed little regard for the real issue at hand. Proposition
218 was never as simple as it seemed. By approving the initiative, voters reversed
nearly 100 years of separate legal treatment between taxes and assessments in
California.35 They showed little, if any, appreciation for the longstanding statutory
and common law authority that treated the two schemes separately. 36 As one official
30. I. at 3.
31. These, again, are the words of Assemblyman Bill Leonard. Martin. supra note 24. at IS.
32. SECRETARYOFSTATE.NOVEMBER, 1996 VOTER PAMPHLET 76 [hereinafter 1996 VOTER PAMPHLET].
33. See id. (arguing that "[a]fter Proposition 13 was passed, politicians created a loophole in the law that
allows them to raise taxes without voter approval by calling taxes 'assessments' and 'fees').
34. Id. at 77. The supporters of Proposition ended theirballot statements with the following admonition: "FOR
THE RIGHT TO VOTE ON TAXES. VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION 218!" Supporters also tapped into popular
distrust of political officials to bring home their point. As they stated, "[u]nder Proposition 218. officials must
convince taxpayers that tax increases are justified. Politicians and special interest groups don't like this idea." Id.
Accordingly, they asserted "Proposition 218 allows you and your neighbors--not politicians-to decide how high
your taxes will be." Id. at 76.
35. These differences will be fully discussed in Part Ill. For now, a statement made by the California Supreme
Court in 1915 will suffice: "[A] special assessment is not. in the constitutional sense, a tax at all. It is a 'compulsory
charge placed by the state upon real property within a predetermined district, made under express legislative authority
for defraying in whole or in part the expense of a permanent public improvement therein . Spring St. v. City of
Los Angeles. 170 Cal. 24. 29-30. 148 P. 217. 219 (1915).
36. See infra Part lIl.A (explaining the justification for treating taxes and assessments differently).
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said, "I would be willing to wager that 99.9% of the voters of the state of California
did not read Prop. 218 and had no idea what they were voting on."
37
In sum, the passage of Proposition 218 some twenty years after Proposition 13
indicates that the tax revolt is still alive and well in California. Since Proposition
13, numerous political trends have come and gone, both in California and the
nation. Yet, with Proposition 218, voters reaffirmed the "tax revolt" and reversed
the restrictive judicial interpretation of Proposition 13.38
B. The Proposition 13 System and its Interpretation
Proposition 13, which enacted Article XIII A of the California Constitution,
places a 1% limit on any ad valorem39 tax imposed on the full cash value of real
property within the state.' For the purposes of determining tax burden, property
value is assessed either at 1975 rates or, if property has been newly built, sold or
transferred since the effective date of Article XIII A, to the year the property was
built, last sold or last transferred.4 Thereafter, increases in property taxes may
factor only for inflation, not to exceed more than 2% in any year.42
Two provisions of Proposition 13 are of particular importance to understanding
the impetus for Proposition 218. Foremost, Section 1 purports to specify that local
governments may impose special assessments if approved by two-thirds of local
voters.43 Section 4 provides that local governments may impose property taxes that
exceed the 1% cap only by obtaining two-thirds voter approval.
4
Like many of the initiatives presented to California voters, the actual language
of Proposition 13 is riddled with vagueness and inconsistency. Because of its
imprecise drafting, the landmark initiative required numerousjudicial clarifications
over the years. Despite withstanding constitutional attacks, 45 virtually all of
37. Ken Ellingwood & Richard Winton, Local Fee Races Discard Idea of ) Person, I Vote Elections: A
Complicated Provision of Prop. 218 Limits Assessment District Balloting to Property Owners, L.A. TIMES, June
16, 1997, at Al.
38. See infra Part IV (discussing the case law interpreting Proposition 13).
39. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 51 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "ad valorem tax" as "a tax imposed on the
value of property").
40. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A. § 1(a).
41. See id. § 2(a) (providing that the "full cash value" for tax valuation purposes is determined by the stated
full valuation of the property on the 1975-76 tax bill or, thereafter, at the appraised value when last purchased. newly
constructed, or when a change of ownership has occurred).
42. Id. § 2(b).
43. Id. § l(b).
44. Id. § 4.
45. Months after its passage, Proposition 13 survived its first major constitutional attack in Antador Valley
Joint Union High School District i State Board of Education. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281. 149 Cal. Rptr. 239
(1978). The court upheld the constitutionality of the initiative on a number of grounds, including holding that equal
protection of the law was not denied. Id. at 237, 583 P.2d at 1294-95, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 252-53. In another case, even
the fact that a commercial store owner paid a ratio of 2.5 to I in property taxes compared to other competitors did
not mean that equal protection was denied. R.H. Macy & Co. v. Contra Costa County. 226 Cal. App. 3d 352, 367,
276 Cal. Rptr. 530. 533 (1990). The United States Supreme Court has also upheld Proposition 13 on equal protection
grounds. Nordlinger v. Hahn. 505 U.S. I. 12-13 (1992).
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Proposition 13's significant provisions have been watered-down to some significant
extent.46
Under the rulings that spawned the enactment of Proposition 218, California
courts have held that the inclusion of the two-thirds vote requirement to enact
"tspecial assessments" under Section 1 of Article XIII A was "surplusage," thus
making the 1% cap on ad valorem property taxes inapplicable to such assessments. 47
Likewise, courts have held that an assessment is not the same as a tax for purposes
of Section 4's two-thirds voter approval requirement. 48
The line of cases encompassing these holdings will be discussed in depth in Part
IV. Before this discussion, however, it is important to have an understanding of the
traditional law of special assessments. This is provided in Part III. With this under-
standing, the reader will be better able to comprehend the reasoning employed by
California courts in holding that special assessments are not subject to the strict
demands of Proposition 13.
III. TRADITIONAL SPECIAL ASSESSMENT LAW
Special assessments are levies imposed by local governments on property to fin-
ance public49 improvements that confer special benefits"0 to the property assessed.
Local governments have used assessments to provide a wide range of public
improvements, including street lighting, sidewalks, parks, flood control, off-street
parking and many others."' These improvements are funded by bonds and financed
through the assessments, which operate as liens against the properties assessed.5"
The use of assessments to finance local improvement projects is by no means
a recent development. Assessments first appeared in thirteenth century England and
were used to finance repairs to sea walls.53 In 1691, assessments crossed the
Atlantic and were used in New York City to pave streets and to build a drainage
46. See generally Derek P. Cole. Review of Selected 1997 Califonia Legislation. 29 MCCEORGE. L, REV.
727 (1998) (providing an overview of the various lines of cases interpreting Proposition 13).
47. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the judicial construction of Section I of Article XIII A).
48. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the case law holding that Section 4 of Article XII1 A is inapplicable to
assessments).
49. See infra Part 1nI.B.2 (discussing the requirement that assessments be levied for a public purpose).
50. See infra Part III.B.I (explaining the special benefits requirement).
51. For instance, the Municipal Improvement Act of 1911 provides a wealth of projects which may be funded
by assessments. These include, inter alia. the construction of sidewalks. sewers, lighting, and bomb shelters: the
provision of facilities and appurtenances for flood and fire protection, and gas and water supply: the gradingof streets,
the planting of ornamental vegetation, the construction and development of transportation facilities, and geological
hazard mitigation. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 5101. 5101.5.5105 (West 1969 & Supp. 1998).
52. The most commonly used assessment scheme, the Municipal Improvement Act of 1913, is often used in
conjunction with the Improvement Bond Act of 1915. Samuel A. Sperry. 1 LAND USE FORUM 174. 174 (1992). See
CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 8500-8887 (West 1969 & Supp. 1998) (setting forth the Improvement Bond Act of
1915); see also, e.g., id. §§ 5372, 10402.5 (West 1969) (stating that the assessment shall attach as a lien against the
property assessed, as provided in § 3115).
53. SENATECOMMIrTEE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT. THE USE Or BENEFIT ASSF.SSM ENTS SINCE PROPOSITION
13. at II (Oct. 1986).
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system.T 4 In California, statutory authority for special assessments dates back to the
turn of this century.55 Even today, when numerous assessment statutes appear on the
books, the two most widely used statutory schemes are still quite old. These
statutes-the Improvement Act of 191156 and the Municipal Improvement Act of
1913 57 -will serve as models for this explanation of traditional special assessment
law.58
A. Assessments Distinguished From Taxes: A Question of Benefits
In the most basic, non-legal sense, assessments are no different than taxes. Both
are compulsory charges collected by government to finance government services.59
Likewise, both are charged on the basis of property ownership and appear on the
property tax statement.' Despite these similarities, however, assessments and taxes
are quite different as a legal matter.
The key distinction between taxes and assessments is the concept of benefits.6"
Taxes are governmental levies imposed on the general population to finance
generally provided services that provide benefits for the entire population.62
Generally provided services refer to such things as education or public assistance.
From these services, everyone within the population equally benefits (at least in
theory).63 Assessments, on the other hand, are imposed on the basis of special
54. Id.
55. Id. at 13.
56. See generally CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 5000-6794 (West 1969 & Supp. 1998) (setting forth the
Improvement Act of 1911).
57. See generally id. §§ 10000-10706 (Vest 1969 & Supp. 1998) (setting forth the Municipal Improvement
Act of 1913).
58. The 1911 and 1913 Acts are explained here because they were the most commonly-used assessment
schemes before Proposition 218 and because they are sufficiently descriptive of the key features and procedures that
comprise the law of special assessments. It should be noted, however, that assessment schemes are scattered
throughout the Califomia Codes and are quite diverse. See generall); e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26230 (West 1988)
(granting the power to impose an assessment lien against property owners who do not comply with local agencies by
removing overhead power lines and preparing property to accept underground lines); id. § 39573 (West 1988)
(allowing the levy of special assessments for abatement of weeds and garbage); id. § 53978 (West 1997) (setting forth
the power to levy assessments for fire suppression and police protection purposes): id. § 65917.5(d) (West 1997)
(providing for special assessments on developers in situations pertaining to child care facility set asides): CAL.
HEALTH &SAFETYCODE§ 32240 (West 1969) (stating that assessments may be levied for hospital purposes); CAL.
STS. & HIGH. CODE § 36000 (West 1969 & Supp. 1998) (allowing the levy of assessments for parking and business
improvement purposes).
59. See infra notes 112, 123 and accompanying text (noting that assessments operate as a lien on the property
assessed).
60. See infra Part II.B.! (describing the requirement that special benefits be levied on a basis of providing
special benefits to property).
61. See infra Part III.B.I (explaining the concept of benefits).
62. General property taxes, unlike assessments, are derived from the general treasury and are not linked to
particular expenditures. Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation: Special Assessments
in Nineteenth-Centnry America, 12 J. LEGAL. STUD. 201,201 (1983).
63. Of course, this does not mean that everyone uses these services. Not every taxpayer has children in school
and most people do not iequire public assistance. In theory, however, everyone is capable of using and benefiting
from such services.
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benefits that accrue to certain, identifiable properties. 64 The government provides
a service-street lighting is a good example-which primarily or exclusively
benefits certain properties (those on the street with the new lights) and not others
(those within the territory of the government without new lights). In this respect,
those properties that enjoy the services are said to be specially benefited. The
rationale underlying special assessments is that only specially benefited properties
should be required to pay the cost of an improvement or service that benefits them;
it would be inequitable for the general public to bear these costs.65
This logic is deeply embedded in historic case law dealing with assessments.
As the California Supreme Court stated in 1915, "[A] special assessment is not, in
the constitutional sense, a tax at all. It is a 'compulsory charge placed by the state
upon real property within a predetermined district, made under express legislative
authority for defraying in whole or in part the expense of a permanent public im-
provement therein .. ."'66 Likewise, the United States Supreme Court noted in
1898,
[W]hile a general levy of taxes rests upon the ground that the citizen may
be required to make contribution in that mode in return for the general
benefits of government, special assessments are . . . made upon the
assumption that "a portion of the community is to be specially and
peculiarly benefited, in the enhancement of the value of property peculiarly
situated as regards a contemplated expenditure of public funds . . . . The
justice of demanding the special contribution is supposed to be evident in
the fact that persons who are to make it . . . suffer no pecuniary loss
thereby; their property being increased in value by the expenditure to an
amount at least equal to the sum they are required to pay."'67
As will be discussed in Part IV, this reasoning underlies the court decisions which
held that the tough anti-tax provisions of Proposition 13 did not apply to special
assessments.
64. See infra Part III.B.1 (explaining the requirement of special benefits to assessed property). Another
difference between taxes and assessments is the fact that taxes are imposed based upon pre-existing jurisdictional
borders (i.e., the county or city limits) whereas special assessments are imposed upon whichever properties within
the jurisdiction of the assessing authority are benefited. Diamond, supra note 62, at 201.
65. Solvang Mun. Improv. Dist. v. Board of Supervisors. 112 Cal. App. 3d 545, 552, 169 Cal. Rptr. 391. 395
(1980).
66. Spring St. Co. v. City of Los Angeles. 170 Cal. 24. 29-30. 148 P. 217. 219 (1915).
67. Village of Norwood v. Baker. 172 U.S. 269. 280 (1898).
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B. Requirements for Levying Assessments
1. Special Benefits to Property Affected
The central authority for levying special assessments is the existence of special
benefits to the property assessed above and beyond any benefits that accrue to the
general population.6 Thus, in Federal Construction Co. v. Ensign,69 the court
declared that "[s]pecial benefits to the property to be assessed, that is, benefits
received by it in addition to those received by the public at large, is the equitable
and just foundation upon which local assessments rest."170As the California Supreme
Court reasoned in Spring Street Co. v. City of Los Angeles,71 the levy of a special
assessment in the absence of special benefits constitutes a "special tax upon a
minority of the property owners, which tax is for the benefit of the public and which
tax is special, unequal and ununiform. ' 72 For this reason, assessments that do not
confer special benefits are unconstitutional. 73
When challenged in court, the scope of judicial review over the determination
of special benefits is quite narrow. 74 In the absence of fraud, gross injustice or
demonstrable mistake, a court will not invalidate an assessment unless the assess-
ment on its face plainly appears to be disproportionate to the benefits conferred.75
Under this standard, courts usually defer to the determinations of legislative
bodies.76 Courts have held that legislative bodies are not required in all instances
to assess property for the exact amount of benefit the property will receive.77
Instead, it is sufficient that they impose an assessment that relates to the cost of the
improvement spread among all property included in the assessment in some non-
discriminatory manner.78 Moreover, courts have held that the assessing authority
need not include all property benefited by an assessment within the boundaries of
68. City ofBaldwin Park v. Stoskus. 8 Cal. 3d 563. 568. 503 P.2d 1333. 1336. 105 Cal. Rptr. 325, 328 (1972)
(citations omitted); 14 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LANV OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 38.02 (3d ed. 1987).
69. 59 Cal. App. 200. 210 P. 536 (1922).
70. Id. at 209, 210 P. at 540.
71. 170 Cal. 24, 148 P. 217 (1915).
72. Id. at 30, 148 P. at 219.
73. Id.
74. Dawson v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 16 Cal. 3d. 676, 684, 547 P.2d 1377, 1382, 129 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102
(1976).
75. Id.; Howard Park Co. v. City of Los Angeles. 120 Cal. App. 2d 242, 245, 260 P.2d 980. 981-82 (1953);
Hanson v. Board of Trustees. 74 Cal. App. 585, 590, 241 P. 572, 574 (1925); Swall v. Los Angeles County. 42 Cal.
App. 758, 762, 184 P. 406, 407 (1919).
76. Nev-Cal Elec. Sec. Co. v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 85 F.2d 886. 902 (9th Cir. 1936): White v. County of San
Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 897, 904, 608 P.2d 728, 73 1-32, 163 Cal. Rptr. 640. 644 (1980). See Hanson, 74 Cal. App. at 590,
241 P. at 574 (noting that the absence of benefits is not a proper judicial question unless the facts relied upon by the
assessing authority are unsupported by evidence): Swall, 42 Cal. App. at 764, 184 P. at 408 (stating that the courts
may interfere only "[i]f the conditions shown by the record ... are so unreasonable as to outrage the common sense
of fairness and justice").
77. White, 26 Cal. 3d at 905, 608 P. 2d at 732, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 644: City of Baldwin Park v. Stoskus. 8 Cal.
3d 563, 568-69, 503 P.2d 1333, 1336, 105 Cal. Rptr. 325, 328 (1972).
78. Stoskus, 8 Cal. 3d. at 568, 503 P.2d at 1336, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
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the assessment.79Likewise, the size of the assessment itself has little bearing in the
determination of special benefits. As the court declared in Ensign, "there can be
no sound reason why the magnitude of the project or the extensiveness of the area
to be assessed should have any decisive bearing on the question" of the validity of
the assessment. 80
There are no definitive standards for determining what constitutes a special
benefit. The only benchmark furnished by the courts is to look at the enhancement
of a property's market value in relation to its potential use.8' For example, the court
in Auburn Lumber Co. v. City of Auburn82 refused to invalidate an assessment
merely because a business would not receive benefit from the creation of a parking
district.8 3 The court noted that the land held by the company would receive eco-
nomic benefits from the district in the future if the land were further developed or
put to expanded commercial use.8 In this respect, the land itself, as opposed to its
occupant, received a palpable benefit sufficient to support a finding of special
benefits. 85 In short, this and similar cases stand for the proposition that special
benefits are measured not by the present use of property, but by the property's
potential use.' Beyond these cases, however, there has been little further guidance
in defining what qualifies as a special benefit.
2. Levy Imposed for a Public Purpose
While case law makes clear that assessments may not be levied for purposes of
conferring purely general benefits, courts never have invalidated assessments simply
because they provide general benefits to the public in addition to the requisite
special benefits.8 ' This is because assessments are public improvements which, by
their nature, necessarily must "have a dual aspect-an aspect of general benefit to
the public as well as one of peculiar local benefit to the lot owners."88 For this
reason, there is a requirement that assessments be levied for a public purpose in
79. Stokes v. Watkinson, 53 Cal. App. 764. 770-71. 201 P. 134, 136 (1921): Hunt v. Manning. 24 Cal. App.
44, 48-49, 140 P. 39, 41-42 (1914). See Hunt, 24 Cal. App. at 48-49. 140 P. at 41-42 (explaining that there is a
presumption that the members of the assessing authority properly considered and determined that all property within
a district would receive benefits from the assessment).
80. Federal Constr. Co. v. Ensign, 59 Cal. App. 200. 215. 210 P. 536, 542 (1922).
81. Aubum Lumber Co. v. City of Auburn, 258 Cal. App. 2d 732. 737-38. 66 Cal. Rptr. 58. 62 (1968).
82. 258 Cal. App. 2d 732, 66 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1968).
83. Id. at 737-38. 66 Cal. Rptr. at 61-62.
84. Id. at 738, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
85. Id.
86. See 51 CAL. JUR. 3D Public Improvements § 24 (1979) ("An assessment is not void merely because the
land is not benefited by the improvement owing to its present particular use. The benefit is presumed to inure not to
the present use, but to the property itself.").
87. Federal Constr. Co. v. Ensign, 59 Cal. App. 200. 210, 210 P. 536. 541 (1922).
88. Id.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 29
addition to providing special benefits.89 Any improvement that confers only private
benefits is therefore invalid.'
Were it not for the public purpose requirement, the Spring Street court
reasoned, "it would be justifiable to order any owner of any vacant lot to build
thereon and to build a prescribed structure, since under the theory of benefits it
could successfully be urged that the enhanced value of the land covers the cost of
the structure compulsorily imposed upon it." 91 Thus, without the requirement, a
local government could impose assessments at will, arguing that the enhancement
to property value confers special benefits to the land.
Because assessments are, by nature, beneficial to the public, property owners
are responsible for paying the general public benefits in addition to the special
benefits to their land. This feature of traditional special assessment law is
important. As will be discussed in Part V, the drafters of Proposition 218 sought to
end this practice, because in their view, it allowed local governments to impose
what were, in effect, parcel taxes.92 This was especially true, they believed, since
case law had created a "loophole" in which local governments could use
assessments to replace revenue lost through the tough anti-tax limits of Proposition
13.93
C. Proceedings to Establish Special Assessments
Under the 1911 and 1913 Acts, an agency must follow specific procedures
before it may levy special assessments on property. These procedures are designed
to ensure that property will not be assessed until basic due process requirements are
met. Generally, these requirements include the provision of notice to owners of a
property proposed to be assessed,94 a hearing on the issue of the assessment,95 and
an opportunity to protest the proposed assessment.' Compliance with these require-
ments can often make assessment proceedings quite lengthy, especially if an agency
chooses to use the 1911 Act. The 1913 Act, with its expedited format, has proven
to be the statute most commonly used by agencies.97 Nevertheless, the procedures
it details still require expending significant time and effort.
89. Id. (stating that "the improvement [financed by the assessment] must be a public one; that is, it must be
one which confers a general benefit upon the public at large").
90. Id.
91. Spring St., 170 Cal. at 30, 148 P. at 219.
92. See infra Part V.A.1 (discussing these changes in Proposition 218).
93. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that case law interpreting Proposition
13 created a loophole allowing local governments to use assessments like taxes).
94. See ihfra Part III.C.2 (setting forth the notice requirements).
95. See infra Part 1l1.C.2 (discussing the hearing requirements under the 1911 and 1913 Acts).
96. See hifra Part I11.C.3 (describing protest requirements).
97. Sperry, supra note 52, at 174.
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1. Overview of Proceedings
a. Improvement Act of 1911
Proceedings to construct improvements under the 1911 Act begin when
detailed plans and specifications for the improvements to be constructed are filed.98
Once these are filed, the legislative body" seeking to impose the assessment must
pass a resolution of intention embodying its desire to do so."° Thereafter, notice of
the resolution is given and a hearing is set for the taking of objections.' Before the
agency holds a hearing, it first must hold at least one public meeting in which
interested parties may give testimony regarding the proposed assessment. 10 2 Only
after the meeting has been held may the hearing take place.0 3 Prior to the start of
the hearing, any person owning property included in the proposed assessment may
object in writing to the imposition of the assessment."°4 If owners representing more
than a majority of land covered by the proposed assessment object, the legislative
body must cease the proceedings. 5 Otherwise, the legislative body acquires
jurisdiction to order that the work be done."°
After the work is finished, an assessment is made to cover the cost of the work
and any incidental expenses. 0 7 The assessment is then filed with the clerk and
notice again is given allowing interested parties to make appeals relating to the
work done or to the correctness of the assessment. 10 8 An agency must publish notice
not less than 15 days before the new hearing and must also give notice by posting
and by mail. t°9 At the conclusion of the hearing, the legislative body must decide
98. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5130 (West 1969).
99. See id. § 5006 (West 1969) (stating that "'[Ilegislative body' when used with reference to a county means
the board of supervisors, and when used with reference to a city means the body which by law constitutes the
legislative department of the government of the city").
100. Id. § 5131 (West 1969). The resolution of intention must state the type of work that will be done, the
location where the work will be done, and must refer to appropriate plans. drawings or the like. Id. § 5132 (West
Supp. 1998). The resolution must also state the date and time of the public hearing to be held on the issue of the
improvement. Id.
101. Id.: see infra Part nlI.C.2 (explaining in more detail the particular notice provisions).
102. CAL GOv'TCODE § 54954.6(a)(1) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998);see id. (providing that local officials must
allow public testimony at the meeting and that the meeting must be held in addition to the required hearing on the issue
of the assessment).
103. Id. § 54954.6(a)(2) (West 1997).
104. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5220 (vest 1969 & Supp. 1998).
105. Id. § 5222 (West 1969 & Supp. 1998).
106. Id. § 5225 (West 1969).
107. Id. § 5360 (West 1969); see supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (noting the case law which holds
that the cost of the assessment need only be spread among owners residing within the assessment district in some non-
discriminatory manner).
108. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 5362. 5366 (West 1969).
109. Id. §§ 5362, 5363 (Vest 1969).
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on all appeals. 1 Its determinations then become final and conclusive."' The assess-
ment is confirmed and attaches as a lien against all property included.1
2
b. Municipal Improvement Act of 1913
Like the 1911 Act, the 1913 Act requires that the legislative body"1 3 adopt a
resolution of intention stating its desire to levy an assessment to finance a public
improvement." 4 The 1913 Act differs from the 1911 Act in that it provides that
after the resolution of intention is passed, the legislative body must refer the matter
of the improvement to a department, commission, or officer." 5 The department,
commission, or officer is responsible for drafting a report pertaining to the improve-
ment. 6 Upon completion, the report is filed with the clerk and presented to the
legislative body.117 After passing upon the report, the legislative body must give
notice and an opportunity to be heard to all interested persons." 8As under the 1911
Act, the agency must hold at least one public meeting regarding the proposed
assessment before it may hold the hearing." 9 Thereafter, at the hearing, any
interested person may object to the proposed improvement.'2 Written 'objection by
owners representing a majority of the land to be assessed effectively ends the
proceedings.' 2' On the other hand, if sufficient protests are not raised, the legislative
body may order that the work be done." The assessment then attaches as a lien
against all property included.'2
110. Id. § 5376 (West 1969).
111. Id. § 5368 (West 1969).
112. Id. §§ 5369, 5372 (West 1969).
113. See id. § 10004 (West 1969) (defining "legislative body" as "any body which by law is the legislative
department of government of the city, or municipality").
114. Id. § 10200 (West 1969 & Supp. 1998); see id. (stating that the resolution of intention must describe the
improvement, specify the boundaries of the assessment district, and that the assessment will be issued by bonds).
115. Id. § 10203 (West 1969).
116. Id.; see id. § 10204 (West 1969 & Supp. 1998) (providing that the report shall contain plans and
specifications of the proposed improvement, a general description of works or appliances already installed, an
estimate of the cost of the improvement, the costs attributable to each parcel of property covered by the assessment,
and a diagram describing the proposed assessment): hifra Part III.C.2 (describing in more detail the particular notice
requirements).
117. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 10203 (West 1969).
118. Id. § 10301 (West 1969 & Supp. 1998).
119. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54954.6(a)()(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998).
120. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 10310 (West Supp. 1998).
121. Id. § 10311 (West Supp. 1998).
122. Id. § 10312 (West Supp. 1998).
123. Id. § 10402.5 (West Supp. 1998).
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2. Notice Requirements for All Special Assessments
Generally, property owners must be given joint notice of both the meeting and
the hearing on the issue of the proposed assessment by mail. 24 The contents of the
joint notice must include an estimate of the amount of the assessment per parcel, a
general description of the purpose for the assessment, the address where owners may
mail written protests against the assessment, a statement that a majority protest will
cause the assessment to be abandoned, the phone numbers and addresses where
owners may receive additional information about the assessment, and the date, time
and location of the public meeting and hearing.t25
Local agencies do not have to provide notice by mail where the proposed
assessment will be levied exclusively for operation or maintenance expenses
imposed throughout the entire territory of the local agencies or where the operation
or maintenance assessments would be levied on 50,000 parcels of property or
more.' 26 In such cases, notice by publication is sufficient. 127 Likewise, certain park
assessments do not require mailed notice and may be noticed through publication
only." Because of these exceptions, the drafters of Proposition 218 felt that the
notice requirements under traditional special assessment law were too liberalized,
to the detriment of taxpayers. 29 For this reason, the assessment procedures specified
by Proposition 218 no longer allow for any exceptions to the requirement that
mailed notice be given to property owners as do the notice provisions described
here. 130
3. Majority Protest Provisions
An essential feature of many assessment proceedings is the opportunity to
protest a proposed assessment. The embodiment of this feature-the majority
protest provision-effectively allows property owners to stop legislative bodies
from imposing assessments.3  Generally speaking, majority protests rarely succeed.
Nevertheless, these provisions are given particular attention here since they now
124. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54954.6(a)(I) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998) (providing that an agency shall give
notice of the public meeting to be held on the issue of an assessment at the same time and in the same document as
the notice for the required public hearing); iM. § 54954.6(a)(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998) (declaring that the agency
shall give such notice 45 days prior to the hearing); id. § 54954.6(c)(1) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998) (stating that the
public meeting must take place no earlier than ten days after the joint meeting). Though only the procedures of the
1911 and 1913 Acts are explained here, it must be noted that these provisions apply to all special assessments, not
simply those covered under the 1911 and 1913 Acts.
125. Id. § 54954.6(c)(2)(A)-(F) (West 1997).
126. Id. § 54954.6(c)(3) (West 1997).
127. Id.
128. Id. § 54954.6(c)(4) (West 1997).
129. HOWARD JARVIS TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION. STATEMENT OF DRAITERS' INTENT (1997) (copy on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
130. See iafra Part V.B.I (explaining the new notice provisions under Proposition 218).
131. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text (describing the majority protest provisions).
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serve as the basis for approval of assessments under Proposition 218. As will be
shown in Part V, the Proposition 218 provisions, though couched in terms of
majority protest, are quite different from the majority protest provisions under
traditional assessment law.
Both the 1911 and 1913 Acts allow owners of property proposed to be included
in the assessments to object in writing to the imposition of the assessment.'32 If
owners representing a majority of the included land object to the assessment, there
is a majority protest. 133 Under both Acts, the legislative body retains the power to
overrule a majority protest by a four-fifths vote. 1" In the absence of a successful
override, however, the legislative body is prevented from imposing the assessment
and may not initiate any further assessment proceedings for one year.' 35
4. Effect of Compliance With Due Process Requirements and Waiver
The protest and notice provisions included in all special assessment schemes,
including the 1911 and 1913 Acts, are necessary so that local governments can
satisfy basic requirements of due process. Under these constitutional requirements,
all persons must be duly notified of the proposed assessment and must have an
opportunity to protest an assessment in order for the assessment to be valid.136 Once
these requirements have been met, a legislative body is required to do nothing
more. 137
In addition to these requirements, both Acts specify that those who fail to
appear and protest waive their right to later challenge the assessment. 38 In this
respect, the failure to appear and protest is deemed as an acceptance of the legis-
lative body's imposition of assessment. 39 A court will set aside a waiver only upon
a showing of fraud, a lack of authority to impose an assessment, or an abuse of
discretion by the legislative body. 4'
132. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5220 (West 1969): id. § 10310 (West Supp. 1998).
133. Id. § 5222 (West 1969): id. § 10311 (%Vest Supp. 1998).
134. Id. § 5222 (West 1969): id. § 10311 (West Supp. 1998).
135. Id. § 5222 (West 1969); id. § 10311 (West Supp. 1998).
136. Coleman v. Spring Constr. Co.. 41 Cal. App. 201, 206, 182 P. 473, 475 (1919): see supra Part In.C.2
(describing the statutory notice provisions).
137. Coleman, 41 Cal. App. at 206. 182 P. at 475-76.
138. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5366 (West 1969): id. § 10310.2 (West Supp. 1998).
139. Id.
140. Brydon v. City of Hermosa Beach, 93 Cal. App. 615. 624. 270 P. 255, 259 (1928).
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IV. THE ASSESSMENT DECISIONS UNDER PROPOSITION 13: THE RISE OF "A
B ORN-AGAIN REVENUE RAISER"
A series of California appellate court decisions handed down a few years after
the passage of Proposition 13 limited the scope of the new anti-tax initiative.
Despite the language of Article XIII A, Section 1, which ostensibly requires that
special assessments be approved by two-thirds vote, these courts held that neither
Section 1 nor the tax limitation provisions of Section 4 applied to special assess-
ments.
141
Cash-strapped local governments cheered these decisions. Fresh from victory,
they quickly tapped into special assessments as a means of circumventing Pro-
position 13's tough tax limitation provisions. For them, special assessments became
a "born-again revenue raiser" almost overnight. But supporters of Proposition 218
feel these decisions "allowed [politicians] to create a loophole in the law that
allows them to raise taxes without voter approval by calling taxes 'assessments' and
'fees.' '1 42 They claimed that special districts had increased assessments over
2400% and cities had raised benefit assessments by 976% since these decisions
were handed down.143 For precisely this reason, supporters argued that Proposition
218 was necessary to "stop politicians' end-runs around Proposition 13."
'144
A. Article XIII A, Section 1
Section l(a) of Article XIII A limits the maximum amount of any ad valorem
tax on real property to 1% of its full cash value. 45 Section l(b) states that the
limitation in Section l(a) does not apply to any ad valorem tax or special assess-
ment approved by two-thirds of local voters. 46 Taken together, these provisions
created a significant question of interpretation for California courts. In effect,
141. Section 1 states,
(a) The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property shall not exceed One percent (1%) of
the full cash value on such property. The one percent (1%) tax to be collected ... according to law to the
districts within the counties.
(b) The limitation provided for in subdivision (a) shall not apply to ad valorem taxes or special
assessments to pay the interest and redemption charges on (I) any indebtedness approved by the voters
prior to July 1, 1978, or (2) any bonded indebtedness for the acquisition or improvement of real
property approved on or after July 1, 1978, by two-thirds vote cast by the voters voting on the
proposition.
CAL CONST. art. XIIt A, § I (emphasis added). Section 4 provides,
Cities, counties and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors of such district, may
impose special taxes on such district, except ad valorem taxes on real property or a transaction tax or
sales tax on the sale of real property within such City, County or special district.
Id. § 4.
142. 1996 VOTER PAMPHLET, supra note 32. at 76.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 77.
145. CAL. CONST. art. X11I A, § 1(a).
146. Id. § l(b).
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Section l(b) makes two exceptions (taxes and special assessments that meet voter
approval requirements) to a general rule which emphasizes only one subject (taxes
subject to a 1% cap).' 47 In two principal cases, County of Fresno v. Malmstrom148
and Solvang Municipal Improvement District v. Board of Supervisors,t49 courts
faced with this "incongruity"' t turned to accepted rules of statutory construction
and the stated purposes for Proposition 13 to hold that this Section did not apply
to special assessments.'
In Malmstrom, the court upheld an assessment on property owners for street and
roadway improvements challenged as a violation of the 1% cap on ad valorem taxes
contained in Article XIII A.5 2 In arriving at this holding, the court relied on three
arguments. First, the court was convinced that the purpose for Proposition 13 was
strictly to control the unchecked growth in ad valorem property taxes that had
become particularly acute in the mid to late 1970's.'1 3 Second, a con-struction of
147. In Solvang Municipal Improvement District it Board of Supenisors, the court illustrated this problem
with a colorful analogy:
Suppose a law governing compulsory military service read:
Section 1. Only one percent of men may be drafted into the military service.
Section 2. The one percent limitation does not apply to male or female civil defense workers. The Board
[which believed Proposition 13 should apply to the special assessment at issue] would argue that
reference to females in section 2 implies they could be drafted for civil defense under section 1. The
District [which believed Proposition 13 did not govern the assessment] would argue that lack of
references to females in section 1 implies they could not be drafted at all.
Solvang Mun. Improv. Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 112 Cal. App. 3d 545, 551-52. 169 Cal. Rptr. 391, 395 (1980).
148. 94 Cal. App. 3d 974, 156 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1979).
149. 112 Cal. App. 3d 545, 169 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1980).
150. Sohvang Mun. hnpron Dist., 112 Cal. App. 3d at 550, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 394 (1980).
151. In Anmador Valley Johit Union High School District it State Board of Education, the California Supreme
Court set the standard followed by all courts in resolving conflicts involving the "imprecise and ambiguous" language
of Proposition 13. The court noted,
[Tihe various uncertainties and ambiguities may be clarified or resolved in accordance with several other
generally accepted rules of construction used in interpreting similar enactments. Thus, California courts
have held that constitutional and other enactments must receive a liberal, practical common-sense
construction which will meet changed conditions and the growing needs of the people. A constitutional
amendment should be construed in accordance with the natural and ordinary meaning of its words. The
literal language of enactments may be disregarded to avoid absurd results and to fulfill the apparent intent
of the framers.
Most importantly, apparent ambiguities frequently may be resolved by the contemporaneous
construction of the Legislature or the administrative agencies charged with implementing the new
enactment. In addition, when, as here. the enactment follows voter approval, the ballot summary and
arguments and analysis presented to the electorate may be helpful in determining the probable meaning
of uncertain language.
Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 22 Cal. 3d 208, 245. 583 P.2d 1281. 1300, 149
Cal. Rptr. 239, 257-58 (1978) (citations omitted).
152. County of Fresno v. Malmstrom, 94 Cal. App. 3d 974, 985, 156 Cal. Rptr. 77, 784 (1979).
153. Id. at 980-81, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 780-81. In a footnote the court opined that the assessments involved in
this case were more like loans to property owners for improvements benefiting their property than they were like ad
valorem property taxes. Id. at 981 n.2, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 781 n.2. The loans were reflected in bonds secured by the
property and were assessed strictly to pay principal and interest. Id. Moreover, unlike taxes, the bond payments would
cease when the bond principal was exhausted. Id. Because of the tax-exempt nature of the bonds involved, the
assessment scheme allowed property owners to obtain loans at below market rates to improve their property. Id.
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Section 1 that included special assessments in the 1% cap on ad valorem taxes
"would result in an illogical conclusion."'' " Such a construction would:
[P]lace local government entities in a rather precarious situation by forcing
them into a Hobson's choice of spending general tax funds either for
expenditures to benefit the public at large or for projects to benefit certain
individual property owners by funding improvements such as the con-
struction of streets, sidewalks, gutters and sewers.
155
This result would not be fair because it would take general funds paid by all tax-
payers and would use such funds to "pay for ... special benefits to a few property
owners."' 56 Finally, the court felt that nothing in the ballot statements accom-
panying Proposition 13 stated that the initiative was intended to limit the ability of
local governments to improve certain areas within theirjurisdiction through special
assessments.'1 7 Instead, the ballot arguments suggested only that Proposition 13 was
aimed at general government taxation and spending.
58
In Solvang Municipal Improvement District, the court endorsed the
Malmstrom rationale by declaring the inclusion of special assessments in Section
l(b) to be "surplusage."' 59 Informing the court's analysis was a key distinction
between taxes and assessments. According to the court:
An ad valorem tax on real property describes a general tax levy which
applies a given rate to the assessed valuation of all taxable property within
a particular taxing district ....
In contrast, a special assessment ... is a charge imposed on particular
real property for a local public improvement of direct benefit to that
property. ... '60
Since assessed property is said to have a special benefit conferred upon it, an assess-
ment provides the means for recouping the cost of the public improvement made on
that particular property.' 6' On the other hand, taxation involves proceeds which
benefit all property owners within a taxing district. 62 Accordingly, the rationale for
treating assessments and taxes differently is the notion that "[t]he general public
should not be required to pay for special benefits for the few, and the few specially
154. Id. at 981, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
155. Id.
156. Id. (citation omitted).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Solvang Mun. Improv. Dist. v. Board of Supervisors. 112 Cal. App. 3d 545, 556, 169 Cal. Rptr. 391, 398
(1980).
160. Id. at 552, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 395: see supra Part IlI.A (examining this rationale more thoroughly).
161. Id. at 553, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
162. Id. at 552, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
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benefited should not be subsidized by the general public."'' 6  Based on this
distinction, nothing in the history of Proposition 13 could be shown to suggest that
the initiative was aimed at controlling special assessments.' 64 Instead, Proposition
13 was meant to address only "general governmental spending and general real pro-
perty taxes levied to finance such spending."'6' For this reason, the court declared
the inclusion of special assessments to be "an aberration that inadvertently crept
into Section L 66
Subsequent cases refined the holdings in these two important cases and
provided additional insight into their rationale. In American River Flood Control
District v. Sayre,167 the court made clear that the rationales of Malmstrom and
Solvang Municipal Improvement District applied not just to fixed special assess-
ments, but also to assessments collected on an ad valorem basis.' 68 The scheme in
American River Flood Control District involved an assessment levied much like
a tax.' 69 The assessment was set at a rate and collected on the county tax roll. 1
70
Upon receipt, the county was responsible for transferring to the district the amount
of the tax roll corresponding to the sum of all revenue derived from imposing the
assessment rate on all property within the district.'' After the passage of
Proposition 13, a conflict between the county and flood control district arose when
the county, based on its own interpretation of Section 1, refused to transfer revenue
derived from the assessment that exceeded the 1% cap on ad valorem property
taxes. 72 The court rejected the county's claim that the assessment in question was
really an ad valorem tax for the purposes of Section 1 and held that the district was
entitled to continue collecting the assessment on an ad valorem basis. 17 3
In City Council of San Jose v. South, 174 the court rejected the argument that
distinguishing special assessments from special taxes promotes "the wholesale
avoidance of the purpose of [Proposition 13]" by noting that democratic safeguards
usually exist under assessment schemes to adequately protect property owners from
the anti-taxation concerns informing Proposition 13.175 Such schemes typically
require hearings and provide property owners the opportunity to conduct a majority
protest that can effectively kill a proposed assessment. 176That these safeguards were
163. Id.
164. Id. at 556. 169 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 136 Cal. App. 3d 347, 186 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1982).
168. American River Flood Control Dist. v. Sayre, 136 Cal. App. 3d 347, 358, 186 Cal. Rptr. 202. 208 (1982).
169. Id. at 350-51, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
170. Id. at 351, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 358-59, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
174. 146 Cal. App. 3d 320, 194 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1983).
175. South, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 330-31, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
176. Id.
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adequate measures of protection was especially true in light of the limited nature
of the assessment involved in that case. 7
B. Article XIII A, Section 4
Like Article XIII A, Section 1, courts have construed Section 4 to be inappli-
cable to special assessments. 78 In Malmstrom, the court reached this conclusion for
largely the same reason the Solvang Municipal Improvement District court later
held Section 1 inapplicable. The court reasoned that:
Taxes are raised for the general revenue of the governmental entity to pay
for a variety of public services. A "special tax" is a tax collected and ear-
marked for a special purpose, rather than being deposited in a general fund.
A special assessment is charged to real property to pay benefits that pro-
perty has received from a local improvement and, strictly speaking, is not
a tax at all. t 9
The court in South built on this rationale by further noting that unlike the require-
ments for taxes, assessment schemes require due process, including notice and an
opportunity to be heard.' 80 Thus, to have construed Section 4 to apply to special
assessments would have rendered that provision unconstitutional.' For this reason,
the elective requirements mandated by Article XIII A did not apply to special
assessments.1
8 2
V. ASSESSMENT LAW UNDER PROPOSITION 218
Proposition 218 enacts Articles XIII C and XIII D to the California Con-
stitution. Article XIII C deals with property taxation while Article XIII D limits the
ability of local governments to impose assessments and fees."8 3 Because of the focus
177. Id. at 330. 194 Cal. Rptr at 117.
178. See supra note 141 (setting forth the text of Section 4).
179. Mahnstron. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 983. 156 Cal. Rptr. at 782-83. The court also noted that applying Section
4 to special assessments might cause the type of problems Proposition 13 was designed to prevent. i. at 985, 156
Cal. Rptr. at 784. As required under Article XIIn A, Section 4. it might be difficult to determine who is a "qualified
elector" in statutory assessment schemes where the property to be improved is owned entirely by one person or where
some of the properties may be owned by non-residents. Id. Thus. "[t]hese situations, and many others, could pose
complex problems of defining the 'qualified electors' of the district.., and provide more layers of governmental red
tape and expense," which are exactly the type of things Proposition 13 sought to eliminate. i.
180. South, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 332, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. The taxation provisions seek to clarify that Proposition 62. an initiative which itself sought to clarify
Proposition 13, applies to chartered cities.
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of this Comment, only those provisions of Article XIII D dealing with assessments
are discussed. 84
In July 1997, the California Legislature passed implementation legislation
clarifying certain provisions of Proposition 218 and resolving many of the
inconsistencies it created with existing law. SB 919,185 embodying these changes,
was supported on a consensus basis by a group convened by the Legislative
Analyst's Office and consisting of representatives from a diverse array of groups
and parties affected by the initiative.
8 6
A. Requirements for Levying Assessments Under Proposition 218
1. Scope of Assessment Charges and Requirement of Proportionality
As discussed in Part III, the use of assessments to finance local improvements
was based on two justifications: that assessments provide special benefits to the
property assessed and that they are levied for a public purpose.'87 These require-
ments remain intact after Proposition 218.188 However, Proposition 218 departs
from prior law by requiring that any incidental benefits that accrue to the public in
addition to the special benefits conferred on the improved property must be
financed through some source other than the assessment, for example, by taxation.'89
In contrast, prior law allowed property owners to be assessed both for the special
benefit to their property and for any incidental public benefits."9 The likely effect
of these changes is that under Proposition 218, certain service-based assessments,
such as those for police, library, ambulance or business improvement, may no longer
be feasibly financed through assessments since additional revenues will be required
to cover the costs of the incidental general benefits to the public.19'
184. More specifically, the provisions of Article XIII D which are discussed are found primarily in Section 4,
which contains all of the procedures and requirements that must be met in order to levy special assessments.
185. See 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 38, sec. 1-10, at 257-64 (enacting SB 919).
186. SENATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFSB 919, at 1-2 (Apr. 16. 1997).
187. See supra Part 1.B (explaining these requirements in depth).
188. The text of Proposition 218 defines an "assessment" as "any levy or charge upon real property by an
agency for a special benefit conferred upon the real property." CAL. CONST. art. XIII D. § 2(b). Absent from this
definition is any mention that an assessment be levied for a public purpose. For this reason, SB 919 clarifies that the
term "assessment" means any charge or levy "that is based upon the special benefit conferred upon the real property
by a public improvement or senice." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53750(b) (West Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). From
this definition, the traditional requirements are therefore preserved.
189. CAL. CONST. art. Xll1 D, § 4(a). The text of this provision states. "[n]o assessment shall be imposed on
any parcel which exceeds the reasonable cost of the proportional special benefit conferred on that parcel." Id. All
assessments must be supported by a detailed engineer's report. Id. § 4(b).
190. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the public purpose requirement which allowed agencies to assess
property for both special and general benefits).
191. ELizABETH G. HILL, UNDERSTANDING PROPOSITION 218. at 24 (1996). Service-based assessments are
those that benefit people, as opposed to properties. Id. at 33. Other services that may no longer be financed through
assessments include libraries, mosquito abatement and recreation programs. i.
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Another significant change from prior law is the degree of precision a
legislative body must use when setting the amount of the assessment. Prior to Prop-
osition 218, there was no requirement that assessments be levied for the exact
amount of benefits each property would receive. 19 Instead, it was sufficient that an
assessment was imposed in some manner that related to the cost of the improvement
and that it was spread among all owners in some non-discriminatory manner. 93
Proposition 218 opts for a more precise allocation by requiring that the amount of
the assessment imposed on each property be proportional to the capital cost of the
improvement. 194 It states in plain terms that "[n]o assessment shall be imposed on
any parcel which exceeds the reasonable cost of the proportional special benefit
conferred." 95
Taken together, these requirements strictly confine the assessment power of
local governments. The reason fortheir inclusion stems from the "loophole" created
by the assessment cases, which is explained in Part IV. After these decisions, the
drafters of Proposition 218 contended that local governments used assessments to
impose what were, in effect, parcel taxes. 96 Accordingly, the drafters felt that the
new requirements were necessary "to permit assessments to be used, once again, as
a legitimate financing mechanism for capital improvements and services that
provides particular benefits to property and not just a means to impose flat rate
parcel taxes."' 97
2. Narrowed Definition of "Special Benefits"
Proposition 218 marches in step with traditional assessment law in defining
"special benefit" as "a particular and distinct benefit over and above general
benefits conferred on real property located in the district or to the public at
large."' 98 However, it narrows the traditional definition by further providing that
192. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the courts held that the amount
assessed need not be proportional to the special benefits conferred upon the property by the assessment).
193. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing a court's decision to this effect). According
to a recent report, the city of Moorpark was considering canceling an assessment rebate for low-income and senior
citizen homeowners because it would conflict with these proportionality requirements. Gloria Gonzales, Moorpark
May Cancel Tax Rebate; Cuy No Longer To Pay Certain Homeowners, L.A. DAILY NEWS. Jan. 21, 1998. at T03.
In order to finance the rebate, the lost assessment revenue from low income or senior property would have to be
subsidized by the other owners covered by the assessment. In this respect, the assessment would exceed the
proportional special benefits received by those who have to pay the subsidies. Id.
194. CAL. CONST. art. XIIi D. § 4(a). The text of this provision states. "[tlhe proportionate special benefit
derived by each identified parcel shall be determined in relationship to the entirety of the capital cost ... of the
property related service being provided." Id.: see id. § 2(c) (defining "capital cost" as "the cost of acquisition,
installation, construction, reconstruction, or replacement of a permanent public improvement by an agency").
195. Id. § 4(a).
196. HOWARDJARVISTAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION. STATEMENT OF DRAFTERS INTENT 10 (1997) (copy on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
197. Id.
198. CAL CONST. art. XIII D. § 2(i).
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"[g]eneral enhancement of property value does not constitute 'special benefit. t 99
The inclusion of this language strikes at cases like Auburn Lumber, which held that
an increase in the value of property in relation to its potential use provided
sufficient benefits to justify an assessment. 2° As the drafters of the initiative
contend "the availability of any public service could provide additional value [to
property]." 20'
3. Elimination of State and Federally-Owned Property Exemption
In recent years, special assessment statutes have provided that state and
federally-owned property were exempt from the levy of assessments. 2°2 Under
Proposition 218, this exemption has been eliminated.2 3 So long as public property
benefits from an assessment, the government must pay its appropriate share.
B. Notice, Hearing and Protest Requirements
Like traditional assessment law, Proposition 218 requires that certain notice,
hearing, and protest requirements be met. These requirements supersede all addi-
tional notice, hearing and protest statutes, including the Brown Act.2' Chapter 38
provides that once these new requirements are met and an assessment is
subsequently approved by local property owners, the body does not need to follow
the procedures again until the assessment is proposed to be increased.205
1. Notice and Hearing
Proposition 218 requires that property owners be given written notice by mail
of a proposed assessment.2' No less than 45 days after notice is given, the legis-
lative body seeking to impose the assessment must then hold a hearing on the issue
of the proposed assessment.2 7 Notice must include the total amount of the assess-
ment chargeable to the district, the amount chargeable to the owner, the duration
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (discussing Auburn Lumber, which held that enhanced
property value was a sufficient basis to support a finding of special benefits).
201. HOWARD JARVIS TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION. STATEMENT OF DRAFTERS INTENT 9 (1997) (copy on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
202. i. at 10.
203. See CAL. CONST. art. Xtit D. § 4(a) (providing that parcels owned or used by any agency, the State of
California or the United States are not exempt from assessment unless such publicly owned properties can show by
clear and convincing evidence that they receive no special benefit from the assessment).
204. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54954.6(h) (West Supp. 1998) (providing that the Brown Act does not apply
to any assessment proceeding conducted in conformance with Proposition 218). See generally id. §§ 54950-54962
(West 1997) (setting forth the"Ralph M. Brown Act" in its entirety).
205. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53753.5(a) (West Supp. 1998).
206. CAL. CONST. art. XIII D. § 4(c).
207. Id. § 4(e).
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of the payments, the reason for the assessment, the date, time and location of the
public hearing on the issue of the assessment, a summary of procedures for com-
pleting an attached ballot, and a statement that a majority protest will defeat the
proposed assessment."' In addition to notice, property owners must be furnished
with a ballot on which they may indicate their approval or disapproval of the pro-
posed assessment.
209
At the hearing, the agency must consider all protests or objections to the pro-
posed assessment. 2 0 Though notice of the proposed assessment is only given to
property owners, any interested person may present written or oral testimony at the
hearing.2n
2. Majority Protest Provisions
Traditional special assessment statutes provided that a majority protest existed
when owners representing more than half of the property to be covered in a pro-
posed assessment filed written protest against the levy of the assessment.22 Under
Proposition 218, however, defeating a proposed assessment now requires only that
the owners opposing the assessment represent more property area than those in favor
of the levy. 3
An illustration explains the difference between Proposition 218 and the old
assessment schemes. Assume a local agency seeks to impose an assessment on an
area covering 100 properties, each property being the same size. 4 Under
208. Id. § 4(c).
209. Id. § 4(d).
210. Id. § 4(e).
211. Unlike the traditional special assessment statutes. Proposition 218 makes no provision for notice by
posting or publication. Accordingly. notice of a proposed assessment is given only to property owners. Despite this
fact, SB 919 clarified Proposition 218 to allow all interested parties. including persons not owning property, to
address the assessment issue at the required hearing. CAL GOV'T CODE § 53753(d) (West Supp. 1998). The
anomalous situation that results is that although non-owners have a right to present testimony at the hearing about the
proposed assessment, there is no legal requirement that they be given notice of the proposed assessment.
212. See supra Part III.C.3 (explaining majority protest provisions under prior law).
213. CAL CONST. art. XIII D, § 4(e);CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53753(e)(2) (West Supp. 1998). The text of Article
XIII D, Section 4(e) states.
The agency shall not impose an assessment if there is a majority protest. A majority protest exists if, upon
the conclusion of the hearing. ballots submitted in opposition to the assessment exceed the ballots
submitted in favor of the assessment. In tabulating the ballots, the ballots shall be weighted according to
the proportional financial obligation of the affected party.
CAL CONST. art. XIII D, § 4(e).
Local governments that are unable to obtain voter approval for certain assessments may face some harsh
consequences. As a result of the defeat of park assessments in Moorpark. the city council faced an immediate
$600,000 shortfall. The city council moved to shut down 2 of the city's 14 parks. ended popular Christmas.tree
lighting, Easter egg hunt and firework ceremonies, and vacated the assistant city manager position. Jesse Hiestand,
Assessment Loss Reflected in Parks. L.A. DAILY NEWS. Feb. I. 1998. at T02.
214. Real world applications of assessment proceedings under Proposition 218, of course, will never be this
simple. Parcel sizes covered by a proposed assessment will likely vary in size and in type of ownership (commercial
or residential). Because Proposition 218 features a weighted voting system, it is possible that one homeowner may
have the same vote as owners of three smaller properties, that one factory owner may have the same vote as ten small
870
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traditional special assessment law, owners representing at least 51 properties would
have to file written protest against the assessment to effect a majority protest. Under
Proposition 218, however, it is possible for two owners to reject an assessment if
only one votes in favor.215 This is because Proposition 218 requires only a majority
of the property that votes to approve an assessment, not a majority of the total
property to be covered by the assessment. Under Proposition 218, it is even
conceivable that only one owner could reject the assessment if no other property
owners vote.2 t6 The result of this change is that unlike traditional special assessment
schemes in which majority protests were rarely invoked, Proposition 218 now
makes the majority protest the basis for the approval of all new assessments. 2'7
Under the new system, each property owner receives a vote in proportion to his
or her respective financial obligation arising from the proposed assessment. 218
Property owners are responsible for mailing or delivering the ballot to the local
body seeking to impose the assessment. 29 All ballots must be submitted to the
business owners, and so forth. The purpose of this over-simplified hypothetical is to show the large disparity between
Proposition 218 in relation to the heavy burden property owners had to meet under prior law.
215. Compare CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 4(e) (providing that "a majority protest exists if... ballots submitted
in opposition to the assessment exceed the ballots submitted in favor of the assessment") (emphasis added), with
CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5222(West 1969) (stating that ifa "protest is made by the owners ofnore than one-half
of the area of property to be assessed.., no further proceedings shall be taken" for a specified time) (emphasis
added).
216. In fact, this has already happened. One commercial property owner cast the only vote in a street lighting
assessment election held recently in Los Angeles. A factory owner, he voted against an assessment that would have
cost him only $156 a year. Ted Rohrlich.LA. Faces Dilemma Over Street Lights. L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26. 1997, at Al.
This article also reports that five similar elections-involving as few as four owners-had resulted in the defeat of
proposed assessments. Id. The various defeats posed an interesting question to the Los Angeles City Council: should
it simply shut out the lights when owners vote against assessments or should it tap into revenues from other taxpayers
to subsidize the property owners? Id. Using other revenues to finance street lights when owners refuse to pay
assessments raises basic issues of fairness. On the other hand. turning off street lights poses safety concerns, as
another city council faced with the same debate concluded. Id.
217. In the ballot statements accompanying Proposition 218,supporters of the initiative responded to criticisms
that these provisions deprive non-owners of the right to vote by stating that "[c]urrent law already allows property
owners . . . to act on property assessments based on the assessment amount they pay. This is NOT created by
Proposition 218." 1996 VOTER PAMPHLET, supra note 32. at 77. Though this statement contains some semblance
of truth, it is misleading. Property owners certainly had the right to stop the levy of an assessment through a majority
protest under traditional special assessment law. But the burdens of securing protests from owners representing more
than half of the property proposed to be assessed were quite onerous and for this reason, quite rare. See supra Part
III.C.3 (explaining the difficulties with traditional majority protest schemes). The result of these tough requirements
was that the question of whether to impose the assessment was usually left to the legislative body. In contrast,
Proposition 218 confers an automatic "right" to vote exclusively on property owners. Whether the assessment is
approved is a question entirely out of the hands of the legislative body proposing the assessment. Because of these
differences, the attempt by supporters of Proposition 218 to couch the initiative in terms of then-existing law was
disingenuous. Any similarities between Proposition 218 and traditional majority protest provisions amount to nothing
more than window-dressing.
218. CAL. CONST. art. XiI D. § 4(e). Although opponents of Proposition 218 hypothesized that this would
allow situations where oil companies owning property would have far more voting power than average homeowners,
this provision does not vary from prior law. See, e.g.. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5222 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998)
(providing that an assessment may not be imposed if owners representing more than half of the property to be
assessed object to the assessment).
219. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53753(c) (West Supp. 1998).
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agency prior to the conclusion of the hearing.' Thereafter, the agency must
tabulate the results to determine if a majority protest exists." Neither Proposition
218 nor Chapter 38 specifies that a majority protest prevents an agency from
proposing the assessment again for a certain period of time, (for example, one year),
as do both the 1911 and 1913 Improvement Acts.222
C. Allocation of Burden in Action Contesting Validity of an Assessment
Proposition 218 requires legislative bodies to prove the validity of an assess-
ment challenged in court.' This is another significant departure from traditional
special assessment law. Under traditional special assessment law, courts deferred
to legislative bodies in regard to assessment determinations, thereby placing the
burden for challenging an assessment on the property owner.22a The result of this
change is that it will be far easier for taxpayers to challenge assessments on the
ground that they do not confer the requisite special benefits or are levied on a basis
that exceeds the proportional special benefits to the property assessed.
VI. IS PROPOSITION 218 CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE "ONE-PERSON, ONE-
VOTE" DOCTRINE?
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, "[n]o
state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." In the heyday of the Warren Court, the One-Person, One-Vote Doctrine
was created on the basis of this constitutional provision. The doctrine essentially
covers two things-the dilution of one person's vote vis-a-vis that of another, and
the denial of a person's vote by a scheme which selectively distributes the
franchise. As originally founded, the doctrine requires that laws which dilute or
deny the voting rights of certain individuals be subject to rigorous judicial
scrutiny.226 The government's interest in diluting or selectively enfranchising per-
sons must be compelling and narrowly tailored to serve such an interest.227
220. Id.
221. Id. § 53753(e)(i) (West Supp. 1998). Chapter 38 clarifies that the agency may use technological methods
such as punch-cards or bar-coding to tabulate the ballot. Id. SB 919 also provides that when more than one person
submits a ballot with respect to one parcel, the agency must weight that parcel's vote according to the financial
interest of each person. Id. The agency must weigh each person's vote according to record ownership interests or,
if the record does not reflect the ownership interests, according to satisfactory documentation provided by the record
owners. Id.
222. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (describing these provisions under the 1911 and 1913 acts).
223. CAL. CONST. art. Xt11 D. § 4(f).
224. See supra Part ll.1.l (discussing the deferential approach given to legislative detenninations by courts).
225. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § I.
226. See infra Part VI.A. I -2.b (explainingthe demanding requirements of the One-Person, One-Vote Doctrine),
227. See infra Part VI.A.1-2.b (explaining these requirements).
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The early One-Person, One-Vote cases involved vote dilution. The seminal
case, Reynolds v. Simms,22 concerned vast disparities in the apportionment of a
state legislature. 9 Subsequent cases extended the scope of this doctrine to cover
the apportionment of local governments.230 In Kramer v. Union Free School
District,231 the One-Person, One-Vote principle enunciated in Reynolds was further
extended to cover the denial of the franchise. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court
handed down a series of decisions invalidating statutes which gave only property
owners the right to vote in elections held to approve bonds.?3 2 The scope of the
doctrine at this time appeared to be quite sweeping.
However, in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage DistricP 
3
and Ball v. James,234 the Court announced a significant exception to the One-
Person, One-Vote doctrine. Under the holdings of these cases, voting schemes that
involve special, limited governmental units whose activities disproportionately
affect certain groups of individuals more than others are not subject to the strict
demands of the One-Person, One-Vote Doctrine.? 5 More deferential review is
accorded to such schemes.
A. The "One-Person, One-Vote" Doctrine
1. The Reynolds Principle
In the landmark case of Reynolds v. Simnms,236 the Court applied the One-
Person, One-Vote standard to invalidate the apportionment of the Alabama State
Legislature. Using 1960 census figures, roughly 25% of Alabama's population
resided in districts electing a majority of the members of both houses of the
legislature. 237 In the most extreme cases, population variance ratios between districts
were 41-to-1 in the Senate and 16-to-I in the House. 8 The Court struck down this
apportionment scheme because it unconstitutionally diluted the votes of those who
resided in the larger districts at the expense of those who lived in vastly smaller
districts.?
9
228. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
229. See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of this case).
230. See infra Part VI.A.2.a (explaining the Supreme Court's decisions in Avery ) Midland County and Hadley
v. Junior College District).
231. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
232. See infra Part VI.A.2.b (analyzing the Supreme Court's bond decisions. Cipriano i Hotwna and City of
Phoenix u: Kolodziejski).
233. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
234. 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
235. See infra Part VI.A.2.c (explaining the elements of this exception to the One-Person. One-Vote Doctrine).
236. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
237. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 545.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 568.
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In reaching this decision, the Court construed the right to vote as funda-
mental-"a bedrock of our political system." 240 For this reason, it believed that
"any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government.' ' 241
In sweeping language, the Court condemned the practice of weighing one person's
vote more than another's. 24 2 "To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased,"
it declared, "he is that much less a citizen."243 The Court announced a standard
which requires that there be "substantial equality of population among various
districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of
any other citizen in the state." 244 Despite the vigorous tone of the opinion, Reynolds
left many issues unresolved. Most notable in the context of special assessment law
is whether the Reynolds principle applied to local governments.
2. The Local Government Exception
a. The Avery/Hadley Line
The Court first extended the Reynolds principle to local governments in Avery
v. Midland County.245 In Avery, a resident of Midland County challenged the
selection of a County Commissioners Court, which, like the Alabama scheme in
Reynolds, was apportioned among grossly disproportionate districts.246 Noting that
local governments were a "major aspect of our system," the Court refused to distin-
guish between state and local governments for purposes of applying the Reynolds
principle.247 Among the powers of the Commissioners Court were the abilities to set
240. Id. at 562. Reynolds is full of similar pronouncements. See. e.g.. id. at 555 (declaring that "the right to
vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is the essence of a democratic society"); id. at 561-62 (stating that "the
right to suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society"): id. at 562 (arguing that "the right to
exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights").
241. Id. at 555.
242. Id. at 566. The Court emphatically stated.
[w]e are told that the matter of apportioning representation in a state legislature is a complex and many-
faceted one. We are advised that States can rationally consider factors other than population in
apportioning legislative representation. We are admonished not to restrict the power of the States to
impose differing views as to political philosophy on their citizens. We are cautioned about the dangers
of entering into political thickets and mathematical quagmires. Our ausn'er is this: a denial of
constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection: our oath and our ofice require no less
of us.
Id. (emphasis added).
243. Id. at 567.
244. Id. at 579.
245. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
246. Under 1963 estimates, the population of the four districts represented by the Commissioners Court were
67.906. 852. 414. and 828. The entire city of Midland. Texas. representing 95% of the county's population, was
included in one district. Avery v. Midland County. 390 U.S. 474. 476 (1968).
247. Id. at 481. The Court explained.
[wihile state legislatures exercise extensive power over their.constituents and over the various units of
local government, the States universally leave much policy and decisionmaking to their governmental
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tax rates, equalize assessments, and issue bonds. 8 The Commissioners Court was
responsible for preparing budgets and possessed wide discretion in determining
what types of projects it would fund.249 In sum, the Commissioners Court exercised
a host of general governmental powers that "include[d] the authority to make a sub-
stantial number of decisions that affect all citizens, whether they reside inside or
outside the city limits."" 0 Because of the significance of these powers, the Court
extended the Reynolds principle to all local governments "having general
governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by the body."'"
In Hadley v. Junior College District,25' the Court affirmed its holding in Avery
by applying the Reynolds principle to a less demanding set of facts. In Hadley, the
Court invalidated a Missouri statute that allowed a member district representing
60% of the total school population to elect only half of the members of the district
board of trustees.5 The district was empowered to administer the general
operations of a junior college5' 4 It could hire and fire instructors, make contracts,
acquire property for district use, and levy taxes or issue bonds accordingly. 255
Acknowledging that these powers were not as broad as those in Avery, the Court
nonetheless believed that the "powers [were] general enough and [had] sufficient
impact throughout the district to justify the conclusion that . . .Avery should[apply]. ''2"
subdivisions. Legislators enact many laws but do not attempt to reach those countless matters of local
concern necessarily left wholly or partly to those who govern at the local level.
Id. For this reason, the Court could see "little difference ... between the exercise of state power through legislatures
and its exercise by elected officials in the cities, towns, and counties" for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.
Id.
248. Id. at 483.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 484.
251. Id. at 485. The Court was careful to point out that "Itlhe Constitution does not require that a uniform
straitjacket bind citizens in devising mechanisms of local government suitable for local needs and efficient in solving
local problems." Id. at 485. Neither the Constitution nor the Court are "roadblocks in the path of innovation.
experiment, and development among units of local government." Id. This language would eventually come to
characterize the local government exception to the Reynolds principle. That is. where the strict mandates of Reynolds
are excused, a case is said to be one in which the Constitution does not stand as a "roadblock in the path of
innovation." Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Bolen. I Cal. 4th 654. 664. 822 P.2d 875. 880. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843,
848 (1992).
252. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
253. Hadley v. Junior College Dist.. 397 U.S. 50. 51-52. 58-59 (1970).
254. Id. at 53.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 54. According to the Court. the critical factor in determining whether the One-Person. One-Vote
Doctrine should apply is whether a political position is an elected one. As the Court explained.
[w]hile there are differences in the powers of different officials, the crucial consideration is the right of
each qualified voter to participate on an equal footing in the election process. It should be remembered
that in cases like this one we are asked by voters to insure that they are given equal treatment, and from
their perspective the harm from unequal treatment is the sane in any election, regardless of the officials
selected.
Id. at 55. Applying this rationale, the Court could discern no difference between the harm caused to one whose vote
for a school board member was impaired and one whose vote for state legislator was impaired. hiL
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b. The Kramer Line
In Kramer v. Union Free School District, 7 the Supreme Court created another
line in the One-Person, One-Vote Doctrine. While Avery and Hadley had involved
vote dilution, the Court issued a series of vote-denial decisions beginning with
Kramer.
In Kramer, the Court invalidated a statute which restricted the right to vote in
New York school district elections to those who owned or leased taxable property
within a district and to parents of children attending schools within a district.2 8
Because the Court reasoned that "[any unjustified discrimination in determining
who may participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials
undermines the legitimacy of representative government," it applied strict scrutiny
as the appropriate standard of review.5 9 Accordingly, it had to determine whether
the exclusion of certain individuals from voting in school board elections was
necessary to promote a compelling state interest.-60 Assuming, but not concluding,
that the state had a compelling interest to limit the right to vote in school district
elections to certain "primarily interested" individuals, 261 the Court invalidated the
statute in question because it was not properly tailored to achieve the state's
interest. '2 The act was both underinclusive and overinclusive..2 63 It "[permitted)
257. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
258. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.. 395 U.S. at 622.
259. Id. at 626. In accord with Reynohls. the Court applied strict scrutiny because "'the right to exercise the
franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights.'" and therefore,
"any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."' Id.
(quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562). In addition, strict scrutiny was necessary since "statutes distributing the franchise
constitute the foundation of our representative society." Id. For these reasons. cases involving the denial of the
franchise., such as Kramer. and cases involving the dilution of the franchise, like ReYnolds. wotld be assessed under
the same standard of strict scrutiny, I.
260. 1I. at 627. Equal Protection analysis generally proceeds along two lines. On the one hand. some laws, like
those involved in Reynolds and Kramer. are subject to strict-scr-utiny. Under this standard, a state must have a
compelling interest and the means it employs to further that interest must be necessary to its achievement, This
standard of review is demanding. "[WIhen the Court applies this standard, legislation invariably falls." 2 DAVID M.
O'BRIEN. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 1270 (2d ed. 1995). Rational basis review, on the other hand, is a
far more deferential standard. To pass this test. a law must simply be "reasonable and Ihavel a rational, conceivable
basis." fi. at 1268 (emphasis added).
Strict scrutiny applies to laws that affect fundamental rights-in this case. the right to vote. Id. at 1270. In
contrast, rational basis review usually applies to economic legislation, hi at 1268. Which standard the Court chooses
in cases involving the franchise is the critical factor in determining which laws are permissible and which are not. As
will be discussed below, the Court has moved away from the demanding strict scrutiny test as evidenced by its later
voting right cases. See infra Part VI.A.2.c (discussing these cases).
261. This assumption will become the basis for the principal cases setting forth the local government exception
to the doctrine. See infra Part VI.A.2.c (explaining these cases).
262. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632-33.
263. The person who challenged the statute in Kramer was a 3 1-year-old stockbroker who lived in his parents'
home. Id. at 624. According to the Court.
[the] appellant resides with his parents in the school district, pays state and federal taxes and is interested
in and affected by school board decisions: however, he has no vote. On the other hand. an uninterested
young man who pays no state or federal taxes. but who rents an apartment in the district, can participate
in the election.
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inclusion of many persons who have, at best, a remote and indirect interest in school
affairs and, on the other hand, [excluded] others who have a distinct and direct
interest in the school meeting decisions." 2" For this reason, the statute was not
"sufficiently tailored" to achieve the goal of enfranchising only those "primarily
interested" in the election.265
On the same day Kramer was decided, the Court in Cipriano v. City of
Houma266 struck down a statute that gave only "property taxpayers" the right to
vote in revenue bond elections.2 67 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court assumed, as
in Kramer, that the statute served a compelling interest but held that it was not suf-
ficiently drawn to further that interest. 268 Because revenue bonds were at
issue-which, in this case, were to be financed through utility rates applicable to
all those who used the service, regardless of whether they owned property-the
state could not show that property owners were any more interested in the elections
than those who did not own property.2 69 Consequently, the line drawn by the statute
between those who did and did not own property could not "meet the 'exacting
standard of precision [the Court] require[s] of statutes which selectively distribute
the franchise.' 270
One year later, the Court extended its protection of the right to vote to general
obligation bond elections in City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski.27 As in Kramer and
Cipriano, the Court struck down the statute on the ground that the line drawn
between property owners and non-property owners was not sufficiently tailored to
serve the state's interest." The Court gave three reasons for its decision. First, the
Court believed that all residents of Phoenix, notjust ihose who owned property, had
an interest in the public facilities that would be funded by the bonds.273 Second,
though Arizona law provided that general obligation bonds be serviced through
property taxes (which, of course, would be paid only by those owning property),
other revenues were legally available to finance the bonds.274 In fact, close to half
of the value of the bonds involved in the case were to be financed through other
local taxes which would be paid by property owners and non-property owners
alike. 5 Finally, even if the bonds were financed through property taxes alone,
Id. at 632 n.15. The act was therefore underinclusive with respect to the appellant and overinclusive with respect to
the hypothetical uninterested, non-tax paying renter.
264. Id. at 632.
265. Id. at 633.
266. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
267. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701. 702 (1969).
268. Id. at 705-06.
269. Id at 705. The Court also noted that any profits derived from the utility would be paid into the city's
general fund and used to finance services that would otherwise have to be supported by taxes. Id.
270. Id. at 706 (quoting Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621. 632 (1969)).
271. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
272. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204. 212 (1970).
273. Id. at 209.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 209-10.
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renters would ultimately share in the burden as the cost of taxation would be
passed-through to them.
27 6
c. The Lines Bhrred: Salyer and Ball
Though the Avery/Hadley and Kramer lines differ in that the former involved
vote-dilution and the latter vote-denial, both dealt with local governmental units
exercising general powers. Avery dealt with a court of county commissioners,
Hadley and Kramer involved school districts, and the bonds in Cipriano and
Kolodziejski were issued by cities. In Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District2" and Ball v. James,"8 the Court was finally confronted with the
issue of whether it should apply the principles enunciated in these cases to elections
involving special purpose units of government exercising limited powers.279 Since
Avery, the first case to extend the Reynolds principle to local governments, the
Court declined to address this issue. Thus, in Avery it declared,
Were the Commissioners Court a special-purpose unit of government
assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of consti-
tuents more than other constituents, we would have to confront the question
whether such a body may be apportioned in ways which give greater
influence to the citizens most affected by the organization's functions. That
question, however, is not presented by this case ....280
Similar pronouncements can be found in Hadley, Kramer, and Cipriano.
28 1
In Salyer, the Court upheld a California statute which allowed only landowners
to elect boards of directors for local water districts. 28 2 The statute allowed the dis-
tricts to undertake improvement projects, financed by special assessments, for the
"acquisition, appropriation, diversion, storage, conservation and distribution of
276. Id. at 210-1i. As the Court noted. "[slince most city residents not owning their own homes are lessees
of dwelling units, virtually all residents share the burden of property taxes imposed and used to service general
obligation bonds." Id. Likewise, property taxes imposed on commercial property would be treated as a cost of doing
business and passed on to the consumer. Id. at 211.
277. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
278. 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
279. Salyer, 410 U.S. at 720.
280. Avery. 390 U.S. at 483-84.
281. See Hadley, 397 U.S. at 56 (stating that, "[i]t is of course possible that there might be some case in which
a State elects certain functionaries whose duties are so far renovedfrom nornal governmental activities and so
disproportionately affect different groups that a populai election in compliance with Reynolds .. might not be
required... ;') (emphasis added), Kramer, 395 U.S. at 621 ("We need express no opinion as to whether the State
in some circumstances might limit the exercise of the franchise those to 'primarily interested' or 'primarily
affected."'); Cipriano, 395 U.S. at 704 n.5 ("lWle find it unnecessary to decide whether a state might, in some
circumstances, limit the franchise to those 'primarily interested."').
282. Salyer, 410 U.S. at 725.
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water."" 3 The district giving rise to the litigation of this case covered 193,000
acres of heavily cultivated farm land and was comprised of a minuscule
population.' 4 Nearly 85% of the land was farmed by four corporations.285 One of
these, the J.G. Boswell Company, owned so much land that it could elect a majority
of the board of directors by itself.286 As a result, no board elections had been held
for many years prior to the commencement of litigation in this case.287 In 1969,
heavy flooding left the land of one of the appellants 15 1/2 feet under water.28 8 This
happened after the district's board of directors tabled a motion which would have
put machinery into operation to divert flood water into a nearby lake.2 9 The
board-dominated by the J.G. Boswell Company-did this because it did not want
to interfere with the harvesting of some of J.G. Boswell's crops.290
Despite the rather harsh consequences of the board's action to the appellant, the
SalyerCourt declared that the water district was the type of limited-purpose district
whose activity disproportionately affected landowners as first envisioned in
Avery. 29' The Court believed the purpose of the district was limited because it pro-
vided no "general public services such as schools, housing, transportation, utilities,
roads, or anything else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal body." 292 The
Court also believed that district elections disproportionately affected landowners
because they were the only ones responsible for paying the assessments and because
assessments, by nature, operate as a lien on their property.293 "In short," the Court
argued, "there [was] no way that the economic burdens of district operations [could]
fall on residents qua residents."'29 For these reasons, the Court refused to extend the
Reynolds principle to cover the water district elections.
295
In reaching this decision, the Court felt it was acting in line with what the
Avery Court contemplated in its pronouncement that there might be occasions in
which the Reynolds principle did not apply.2' But instead of applying strict
scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review, the Court, without explanation,
283. Id. at 723.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 735 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This fact, and the remaining facts from the immediate paragraph in
the text were not mentioned in the majority opinion. Only Justice Douglas. in his dissenting opinion, chose to discuss
them. It is probably better that the majority failed to mention these facts because they accentuate the rather harsh
results of the Supreme Court's holding in this case.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 737-38 (Douglas. J.. dissenting).
289. Id. at 737 (Douglas. J., dissenting).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 728.
292. Id. at 728-29.
293. Id. at 729.
294. Id.
295. 1i. at 730.
296. The Court stated. "[wle conclude that the appellee water storage district ... is the sort of exception to
the rule laid down in Reynolds which the ... decision in Avery... contemplated." Id. at 728.
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chose to adopt the rational basis test.297 After concluding that the state had a
sufficient interest in this case to limit the right to vote to landowners, the Court, per
Justice Rehnquist, proceeded to assess the equal protection claim by determining
only whether the denial of voting rights for those not owning property was wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objectives.298
The Court thus signaled a shift from its previous decisions. When the Kramer
and Cipriano courts discussed the situation that Avery first contemplated, they did
so in the context of applying strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review.299
As the Court explained in Kramer, "if a challenged state statute grants the right to
vote to some bona fide residents . . . and denies the franchise to others, the Court
must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state
interest.3 °" By holding that the classifications in Kramer and Cipriano were not
properly drawn, the Court held that they were not necessary to achieve their goal,
which the Court merely assumed constituted a compelling interest. It follows,
therefore, that if the Court would have been presented with a district that fit the
characteristics of the situation it envisioned, it would have required that the state
put forth a compelling interest to justify the classification. But this was apparently
not the case in Salyer. Though the Salyer Court was not explicit about what level
of interest the state had-compelling or otherwise-when it concluded that the
state could limit the right to vote to property owners, its phrasing of the issue as to
whether the means chosen by the state were "wholly irrelevant" to achieving its
objectives means that it adopted the less demanding rational basis test.30 1 However,
the Court gave absolutely no reason why it departed from precedent and adopted
this less demanding test.
Applying this relaxed standard, the Court had little trouble upholding the
California statute. The Court rejected the argument that the statute was invalid
because farmers would pass the costs of the assessments on to residents within the
district.302 "Constitutional adjudication cannot rest on any such 'house that Jack
built' foundation," it declared. 0 3 Only three years earlier in Kolodziejski, however,
the Court relied on such a "pass-through" rationale to invalidate a law which
denied non-property owners the right to vote in general obligation bond elections.30
4
In addition, the Court reasoned that because assessments operated as liens against
297. See id. at 730 (stating that appellants were entitled to have their equal protection claim assessed to
determine whether the denial of the franchise to those who did not own property was "'wholly irrelevant"' to the
state's objectives).
298. Id. at 731.
299. See Kramer. 395 U.S. at 626 (declaring that the statute in question required "close and exacting
examination"); Cipriano, 395 U.S. at 704 (requiring the statute challenged in that case to be "necessary to promote
a compelling state interest").
300. Kra ,er, 395 U.S. at 627 (emphasis added).
301. See supra note 260 (explaining the rational basis test).
302. Salyer. 410 U.S. at 731-32.
303. Id.
304. See supra note 276 and accompanying text (discussing this rationale in the Kolodziejski opinion).
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property, a state could rationally conclude that only property owners should be
enfranchised. 5
In Ball v. James,3° the Court extended the Salyer holding to encompass a much
broader set of facts. Ball concerned an Arizona water district serving nearly half the
population of the state.307 Only landowners could elect the directors of the
district.305 Unlike the district in Salyer, which supplied water exclusively to farm
land, 40% of the water provided by the district in Ball went to urban areas or was
put to non-agricultural uses.31 Moreover, most of its capital and operating expenses
were paid by revenues generated from the selling of electric power.310 Thus,
whereas the property owners in Salyer were exclusively burdened by special
assessments, property owners and non-property owners alike were responsible for
financing the function of the district in Ball.
Applying the rational basis test as the standard of review, the Court concluded
that these dissimilarities did not amount to a "constitutional difference. ' '31' It gave
three justifications for its reasoning. First, no matter how large the operations of the
district may have appeared, it did not have the power to levy taxes, pass laws
governing the conduct of citizens, or administer "such normal functions of govern-
ment as the maintenance of streets, the operation of schools, or sanitation, health,
or welfare services. '312 Second, the Court considered the water districts permitted
by the Arizona statute to be "essentially business enterprises, created by and chiefly
benefiting a specific group of landowners." 313 Thus, the "nominal public character"
of the districts was not enough to "transform it into the type of governmental body
for which the Fourteenth Amendment demands a one-person, one-vote system of
election. 3 4 Finally, the sheer size of the districts' operations was not itself a valid
reason to apply the One-Person, One-Vote Doctrine. 3" Building on the second
305. Salyer.410 U.S. at 731. On the same day Salyer was decided, the Court issued a brief per curiam opinion
upholding a Wyoming law allowing the creation of watershed improvement districts. District projects were financed
through special assessments. As in Salver, the fact that the assessment,; operated as liens on the assessed property
was sufficient to support a finding that the law disproportionately affected those owning property within the districts.
Associated Enter., Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Impr. Dist.. 410 U.S. 743, 744 (1973).
In dicta, the Court made some interesting statements in response to a dissenting opinion filed by Justice
Douglas. Justice Douglas argued that the challenged law gave wealthy landowners the sole authority to make certain
important land management decisions. The Court responded by noting that the challenged law had been passed by
a state legislature in which all electors, regardless of their status as property owners, had a chance to participate in
the political process. Likewise, because the districts could only be formed upon a sufficient finding by a county board
of supervisors, non-property owners retained political representation through such popularly elected supervisors. Id.
at 744-45.
306. 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
307. Id. at 365.
308. Id. at 357.
309. Id. at 365.
310. Id. at 365-66.
311. Id. at 366.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 368.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 370.
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point, the Court stated, "no matter how great the number of nonvoting residents
buying electricity from the District, the relationship between them and the District's
power operations is essentially that between consumers and a business enterprise
from which they buy. 3
16
Ball represents a quantum leap in the local government exception as initially
conceived in Salyer. The Court's conclusion that the district activity involved in
Ball disproportionately affected property owners was quite dubious." 7 Nevertheless,
this Court's holding demonstrates the fact that it has shifted away from the
sweeping pronouncements it once issued in cases like Kramer. To the extent that
any of the early One-Person, One-Vote cases suggest that any selective distribution
of the franchise is constitutionally impermissible, Ball suggests otherwise.
d. Recap: The Shifting Models of Local Government
Professor Briffault asserts that the Supreme Court's decisions in Salyer and
Ball reflect its adoption of a proprietary model of local government in cases
involving the distribution of voting rights for certain special purpose
districts. 18 According to his characterization, "[tihe proprietary model underscores
the continuing power of the idea... that those who have the primary financial stake
in local operations ought to have a controlling voice in governance decisions."3 19
This contrasts with the democratic model, at work in the court's Kramer, Cipriano
and Kolodziejski cases, which holds that all distributions of the franchise must serve
compelling governmental needs and be strictly drawn to achieve such needs. The
problem with this bifurcated approach, Briffault argues, is that the factors which
separate the two models are analytically unsound and often difficult to apply.320
Under the test announced in Salyer and Ball, the local government exception
applies to special-purpose units of government whose activities disproportionately
affect certain individuals more than others.32' According to Briffault, the special-
purpose government criterion is arbitrary. 22 The distinctions the Court has made
between which powers are general and which are limited, for instance between the
storage and distribution of water (limited purpose) and "sanitation, health or
316. Id.
317. See LAURENCETRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-4. at 1068 n.19 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that
"[t]he Court's conclusion that the district's activities disproportionately affected landowners seems doubtful").
318. Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments. 60 U. CHI. L.
REV. 339.360-70 (1993).
319. Id. at 360.
320. See infra notes 322-25 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Briffault's criticisms of the
SalyerlBall tests).
321. See supra Part VI.A.2.c (discussing this test in the context of its origin in the Salyer and Ball cases).
322. Briffault. supra note 318. at 370.
882
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 29
welfare services" (general purpose), are quite tenuous.3" Likewise, Briffault
believes that the disproportionate impact criterion is a product of circular
reasoning.324 Whether the Court believes that a disproportionate impact exists
depends on whether the Court is willing to base its analysis on the notion that the
costs of taxes, bonds or assessments levied on property are passed through to lessees
and consumers.3" When the Court has used the democratic model, it has accepted
this notion.326 When the Court has applied the proprietary model, on the other hand,
it has ignored this notion.327 The problem with this approach is that the notion of
pass-through economics is something that should drive the analysis, not something
that is applied or rejected based upon which model the Court adopts. In this respect,
the disproportionate impact criterion is entirely tautological.
This distinction between the proprietary and democratic models of local
government is aptly demonstrated by the California Supreme Court's decision in
Southern California Rapid Transit District v. Bolen,328 discussed below.329
323. Id. at 375. Briffault notes that there are over 3,000 local governments that address water management
functions. Id. at 374. "How can governmental activity so widespread not be a normal function of government?," he
argues. Id. In sum, Briffault's view is that this criterion is based not on any genuine theory distinguishing general and
special governmental functions, rather it is based on a "laundry list" of things the court has construed to be general.
Id. at 373.
Briffault also criticizes the distinction that has arisen in this regard between taxes and assessments. He notes
that some courts have come to see the assessment/taxation distinction as critical-with the power of taxation
connoting general governmental powers and the power to levy assessments connoting the existence of a special
purpose governmental unit. Id. at 373. But both powers are coercive and are effected through compulsory charges
without the consent of the payor, he argues.1d. Moreover, both have historically been used to finance the construction
and maintenance of public improvements and infrastructure. Id. at 373-74. For these reasons, he believes that
"assessments are as governmental as taxation." Id. at 374. But compare Part Ill.A, for a discussion of the legal
differences between taxes and assessments and Part IV. explaining the logic of California courts which held that
assessments and taxes were distinct for purposes of the constitutional restrictions imposed by Proposition 13.
324. Briffault, supra note 318, at 370.
325. See id. at 371 (stating that,
[t]helocal democracycases utilize an expansive definition of economic impact and assume that those who
initially pay local government taxes or assessments will pass those costs on to others so that the incidence
of local financing is diffused throughout the community .... Few, ifan3i can maintain that they are so
disproportionately affected by local action as to justify a representative scheme that benefits them.
The proprietary model's method of assessing impact. as exemplified in Salver and. especially, Ball
is to consider only those who bear the economic burdens of the local government's actions, not those
whose sole interests is in its services.)
(emphasis added).
326. See supra Part VI.A.2.b (discussing the Kramer line of cases in which these things were factored in to
the analysis).
327. See supra Part VI.A.2.c (explaining the rationale of the Salyer and Ball cases).
328. 1 Cal. 4th 654. 822 P.2d 875, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843. cert. denied sub nom. Atchison. Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry. Co. v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist.. 505 U.S. 1220 (1992).
329. Professor Briffault believes Bolen "nicely illustrates the difficulty ofdetermining whethera particularlocal
election falls within the democratic or the proprietary paradigm." Briffault. supra note 315, at 377.
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B. The Doctrine Applied in California: Southern California Rapid Transit
District v. Bolen
In 1992, the California Supreme Court applied the One-Person, One-Vote
framework in a case involving special assessments levied to finance a rapid trans-
portation system in Los Angeles. In Southern California Rapid Transit District v.
Bolen,330 the court upheld a statutory scheme that limited the right to vote on
assessments proposed by a specially created regional transportation agency to those
who would be subject to the assessments.33" ' This agency, the Southern California
Rapid Transportation District ("SCRTD"), served as the "lead agency for the con-
struction, financing, and operation of 'a comprehensive mass rapid transit system
in the southern California area . . . ,33 SCRTD was permitted to create special
assessment districts to finance the various projects it undertook.333 The litigation of
this case concerned two assessment districts created in Los Angeles.3 4 Both dis-
tricts were to be used to collect assessments only from commercial property owners
benefited by the projects. 33' Thus, under the statute, residential homeowners as well
as those who lived in, but did not own, property within the district would have been
prohibited from voting in any referendum called to approve the district assess-
ments. 33
6
The threshold issue for the court was which standard of review to apply to the
challenged assessment scheme. In a footnote, the court addressed this issue by
"reject[ing] at the outset the proposition that the principle of Reynolds . . . is
triggered simply because a limited class of those otherwise qualified to vote is
enfranchised by the voting scheme in issue." 337 Characterizing the language in early
One-Person, One-Vote decisions like Kramer as "sweeping," the court went on to
note that some of the United States Supreme Court's "later cases [i.e., Salyer and
Ball] have undermined that proposition to such an extent that it fairly can be
330. 1 Cal. 4th 654, 822 P.2d 875, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (1992).
331. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Bolen, I Cal. 4th 654. 659, 822 P.2d 875. 876. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843,
844 (1992).
332. Id. at 659, 822 P.2d at 877, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (quoting CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 33001(a) (West Supp.
1998)).
333. Id. at 660, 822 P.2d at 877. 3 Cal. Rptr. at 845. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 33001 (West Supp. 1998)
(providing that the SCRTD may create benefit assessment districts for the purposes of levying special transportation
assessments). See also id. § 33000 (West Supp. 1998) (declaring that "it is necessary and in the best interest of the
citizens of the state to authorize the [SCRTD] to levy special benefit assessments for needed public rail rapid transit
facilities and services on the property which benefits from those facilities and services").
334. Bole,. I Cal. 4th at 662, 822 P.2d at 878. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 846.
335. Id. at 660. 822 P.2d at 877.3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845.
336. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 33002.1-33002.2 (West Supp. 1998) (stating that the SCRTD board need
not hold an election among voters unless a petition is submitted by owners representing at least 25% of the assessed
value of the real property within the assessment district): id. § 33302.3 (West Supp. 1998) (defining "voter," for
purposes of these election requirements, as "an owner of real property which is assessed or proposed to be assessed
under this chapter and which is in the boundaries of the benefit district").
337. Bolen. I Cal. 4th at 665 n.4. 822 P.2d at 880 n.4. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 848 n.4.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 29
doubted to be the rule.' 38 With this view of the High Court's One-Person, One-
Vote jurisprudence in mind, the court then proceeded to apply the Salyer and Ball
framework to determine whether the Reynolds principle applied, requiring strict
scrutiny, or whether the local government exception applied, requiring only rational
basis review.339 Because the assessments in question were to be levied by a "special
purpose unit of government" whose activity "primarily affected" only those eligible
to vote, the court concluded that the assessment election schemes in question
qualified for rational basis review under the local government exception. 4
The court had little difficulty finding that the special purpose unit of govern-
ment criterion was satisfied despite the rather broad powers of the SCRTD.?' This
is because the court chose the assessment districts, not the SCRTD, as the govern-
mental unit implicated by the One-Person, One-Vote Doctrine.34 Having construed
the issue this way, it was easy to argue that the assessment districts were not the
type of body "invested with ... powers remotely similar to the 'general govern-
mental powers' to which the principle of Reynolds ... presumptively applies. '' 3
The districts lacked any indicia of governmental powers because "they [were] little
more than formalistic, geographically defined perimeters whose raison d'etre [was]
to serve as the conceptual medium for the recognition of economic benefits con-
ferred and the imposition of a corresponding fiscal burden. ' 344
Justice Kennard, dissenting, characterized this reasoning as "fundamentally
erroneous" and "senseless." 345 She noted that the SCRTD was not the only respon-
sible for imposing and collecting the special assessments, but also for conducting
any referendum called on the issue of the approval of the assessments.3 6 The
assessment district, on the other hand, "[had] no governing body, no employees, and
no powers or responsibilities [and was] not a public entity." 347 Since, in her view,
the SCRTD was the body properly implicated by the doctrine, strict scrutiny should
have applied.348Citing Salyer, Kennard noted that the Supreme Court has construed
the provision of transportation as a general governmental power requiring adherence
to the Reynolds principle.3 9
Notwithstanding this objection, the court next concluded that those not enfran-
chised by the voting scheme in issue were not sufficiently as interested in the out-
338. Id.
339. Id. at 665. 822 P.2d at 880, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 848.
340. Id. at 675, 822 P.2d at 887-88. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855-56.
341. See id. at 669, 822 P.2d at 883, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 851 (declaring: "[Mianifestly, the benefit districts at
issue here are not invested with and do not exercise powers remotely similar to the 'general governmental powers'
to which the principle of Reynolds ... presumptively applies.").
342. Id. at 670, 822 P.2d at 884. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 852.
343. Id. at 669, 822 P.2d at 883. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 850.
344. Id.




349. Id. at 684, 822 P.2d at 894. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862 (citing Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728-29).
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come of assessment referendums as those permitted to vote. 50 To support this
conclusion, the court argued that non-property owners could no more claim to have
been affected by the voting scheme than could anyone else living in metropolitan
Los Angeles who would use the public transportation system provided. 35' Moreover,
unlike the bonds involved in Cipriano and Kolodziejski, the economic burdens of
the transportation assessments would fall exclusively and directly on those com-
mercial owners enfranchised by the voting scheme.352 No costs would be shifted to
non-property owners or residential property owners.353
Once the Salyer/Ball criteria were satisfied, the court upheld the statute on
rational basis grounds. The court believed,
[t]he Legislature reasonably could have permitted the exclusion of [non-
owners and residential property owners] on the obvious ground that limiting
voting to those who will directly bear the cost of the assessments is
demonstrably fairer or more equitable than including those whose
affirmative vote carries no personal financial consequences or risk.354
In sum, with its emphasis on the assessment districts and not the government
imposing them, Bolen is indicative of a transformation in the local government
exception to the One-Person, One-Vote Doctrine. As Professor Briffault notes,
Bolen underscores the significance of Ball in extending the proprietary
model from the sparsely populated, exclusively agricultural setting of
Salyer, where there may be no general purpose local government with
powers adequate to the task, to metropolitan areas where the service or
facility in question could be provided by a democratically elected
government. 355
C. Are Proposition 218's Assessment Approval Requirements Constitutional?
Proposition 218 provides, "[b]ecause only special benefits are assessable,
electors residing within the district who do not own property within the district shall
not be deemed ... to have been deprived of the right to vote for any assessment. ' 356
It is obvious from the inclusion of this language that the drafters of Proposition 218
350. Id. at 673. 822 P.2d at 886. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 854.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. See id. at 674. 822 P.2d at 887. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855 (rejecting the argument that lessees would receive
pass-through economic treatment from the assessments levied on property owners as appropriate to the analysis by
noting that consumers would also receive such pass-through treatment in the price of the goods and services they pay
for).
354. Id. at 676, 822 P.2d at 888, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856.
355. Briffault, supra note 318, at 380.
356. CAL. CONST. art. Xll1 D, § 4(g).
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foresaw a possible One-Person, One-Vote challenge to the initiative.357 For this
reason, they included a savings clause which requires that assessments shall be
approved by a two-thirds vote of the local electorate in addition to being approved
by property owners if the assessment approval provisions of Proposition 218 are held
unconstitutional.358
Applying the teaching of the cases discussed above, and in particular, the
California Supreme Court's decision in Bolen, two questions must be asked to deter-
mine what level of equal protection scrutiny would apply to the assessment pro-
visions contained in Proposition 218. First, are local governments acting under
Proposition 218 vested with only limited governmental powers?Second, are property
owners disproportionately affected by assessment proceedings conducted in accord
with Proposition 218? If neither question can be answered in the affirmative, we
must apply strict scrutiny. If both can be answered in the affirmative, we must
determine only if there is a rational basis for Proposition 218. An understanding of
which standard will apply is crucial because a court which only has to apply the
rational basis test will inevitably have little trouble upholding the new assessment
approval provisions.359
When put through this analysis, it is hard to escape the conclusion that a court
can easily answer both questions in the affirmative and uphold Proposition 218 on
rational basis grounds. This is primarily because of the Bolen court's emphasis on
construing the assessment districts as the governmental bodies implicated by the
One-Person, One-Vote Doctrine and Proposition 218's restrictive definitional and
proportionality requirements pertaining to special benefits.
1. Does the Local Government Exception Apply?
a. Are Local Governments Acting Under Proposition 218 Vested with
"General Governmental Powers?"
Under Proposition 218, "local government" is defined to mean "any county,
city, city and county, including a charter city or county, any special district, or any
other local or regional governmental entity."3" Essentially, and by design, this
357. See, e.g., Ken Ellingwood. Local Fee Races Discard The Idea of I Person. I Vote Elections: A
Complicated Provision of Proposition 218 Limits Assessment District Balloting to Property Owners. L.A. TIMES,
June 16, 1997, at Al (noting that the Los Angeles City Council voted to challenge Proposition 218 on the grounds
that it denies renters of the right to vote on assessments). id. (stating that the city council did not likely have the
requisite standing to sue).
358. CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 4(g).
359. See supra note 260 (explaining the deferential rational basis test).
360. CAL. CONST. art. X1I1 C, § l(b). Though the portion of Proposition 218 dealing with assessments, Article
XIII D, uses the term "agency" in lieu of"local government." Section 2(a) of that Article provides. "[a]gency' means
any local government as defined in subdivision (b) of Section I of Article XiI1 C:" Id. art. XI11 D, § 2(a). For this
reason, "local government" is used throughout this Part instead of "agency."
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definition includes every governmental entity in California short of the state itself.3 6,
For this reason, the new assessment procedures apply equally to every type of local
government in the State-no matter what the size or purpose-from the smallest
park and recreation district all the way up to the Los Angeles County Board of
Supervisors.
Under this criterion of the One-Person, One-Vote analysis, concern lies with
whether the powers possessed by local governments are general, or special and
limited in purpose.362 At first blush, Proposition 218 would appear to apply to both
types of governments. Because of its exhaustive definition of "local government,"
one would assume, quite logically, that the hypothetical park and recreation district
mentioned above would qualify as one which possesses limited powers, and the Los
Angeles County Board of Supervisors would qualify as a governmental body which
possesses broad, general powers. This distinction is critical because under Salyer and
Ball, only limited, special purpose governments are exempt from adherence to the
One-Person, One-Vote requirement.3 63 Viewed in this manner, Proposition 218
appears to be unconstitutional because it requires the board of supervisors, a govern-
mental body vested with general powers, to conduct assessment proceedings without
giving non-property owners a right to vote.' 64
But as the California Supreme Court's decision in Bolen teaches us, we are to
look to the special assessment districts for purposes of applying the One-Person,
One-Vote Doctrine, not at the governmental bodies which create the districts. 365
Professor Briffault notes that this line of reasoning raises an interesting dilemma:
A referendum on whether to impose an assessment on property to fund
public improvements conducted by a general purpose government must be
open to all eligible voters . . . . But if the state authorizes the general
purpose government to create a special assessment district to assess
landowners for the benefits they will receive from the public improvements
that will be funded by the assessment, then as Bolen indicates, the
assessment district may be treated as a proprietary government.
[Kolodziejski] may be avoided by the creation of a local entity whose sole
361. HOWARD JARVIS TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT OF DRAFTERS INTENT 2 (1997) (copy on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
362. The first prong of the Salyer/Ball formulation is to determine whether a local government is one which
possesses general powers. See silwra Part VI.A.2.c (explaining the derivation of this prong of the test in the Salyer
and Ball cases).
363. See supra Part VI.A.2.c (explaining Salyer and Ball).
364. Of course, the fact that Proposition 218 implicates governmental bodies exercising general powers is not
enough, standing alone, to invalidate the initiative. It is still entitled to equal protection review under the strict scrutiny
test. But as the decisions in Kramer Cipriano, and Kolodziejski make clear, once the Court applies strict scrutiny,
it is very doubtful that it will uphold laws which selectively distribute the franchise. See supra Part VI.A.2.b
(explaining this line of cases).
365. See supra notes 341-44 and accompanying text (explaining this reasoning of the Bolen opinion).
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purpose is to conduct a referendum, although if a general purpose local
government had conducted that election, [Kolodziejski] would apply.366
Thus, the appropriate question for determining whether this criterion of the doctrine
is satisfied is whether Proposition 218 requires the creation of districts through
which assessments are collected. If it does, then no matter which unit of local
government acts in accord with its provisions, no matter its size or the degree of
powers vested in it, the district will qualify under the local government exception
for rational basis review. If it does not, and a set of facts can be shown whereby an
assessment is levied by a local government exercising general governmental powers,
we may proceed with strict scrutiny review if the voting scheme in question does
not meet the next prong in the analysis-the "disproportionate effect" criterion.
While the language of Proposition 218 lacks clarity on this issue, it appears to
require that all local governments seeking to impose assessments do so by creating
assessment districts. 67
This requirement is not spelled out in Proposition 218 as it is in other special
assessment schemes. For example, the Improvement Act of 1911 provides that
"[t]he legislative body shall make the expense of such work [that will be the
subject of the assessment] chargeable upon a district, which the legislative body
shall.., declare to be the district benefited by the work, and to be assessed and to
pay the cost and expense thereof.'3 68 Similarly, the statute upheld by the Bolen
court states that "[w]henever the [SCRTD] board finds that property ...will
receive special benefit ... the board may ... provide for notice and hearing of its
intention to establish . . . special benefit districts and to levy a special benefit
assessment on real property therein. 3 69 In these statutes, the formation of a district
is a condition precedent to the levy of assessments. In contrast, no such explicit
statement is contained in the text of Proposition 218.
Despite the absence of an explicit requirement that a district be created, the
word "district" appears throughout Section 4 of Article XIII D, which sets forth all
of the procedures and requirements pertaining to assessments. Subdivision (c) pro-
vides that notice of the proposed assessment must contain information regarding the
"total amount [of the assessment] chargeable to the entire district."3 7 Subdivision
(d) then requires that notice mailed to "parcels within the district" include a ballot
with appropriate information. 7' Subdivision (g) purports to address the One-Person,
One-Vote issue by stating that "electors residing in the district who do not own
property within the district shall not be deemed" to be deprived of their rights
366. Briffault, supra note 318, at 380.
367. Seeinfra notes 370-73 and accompanying text (explaining the use of the word "district" in the procedural
requirement section of Proposition 218 and its definition).
368. CAL. STS. & HItH. CODE § 5180 (West 1969) (emphasis added).
369. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 33001(a) (West Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
370. CAL CONST. art. Xiil D. § 4(c) (emphasis added).
371. Id. § 4(d) (emphasis added).
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under One-Person, One-Vote standard.372 Finally, subdivision (a) states that
"[p]arcels within a district" owned by the state or federal government shall not be
exempt from an assessment.373 Thus, while there is no explicit statutory provision
which requires that a district be formed as a condition precedent to the levy of an
assessment, such a requirement can be safely implied based on the use of the word
"district" in the five places above.
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the drafters of Proposition 218
actually took care to define the term "district." By its definition, "district" means
"an area determined by an agency to contain all parcels which will receive a
special benefit from a proposed public improvement or property-related service."
'374
As discussed in Part V, special benefits to the assessed property are the essential
justification upon which assessments may be imposed under Proposition 218.
Therefore, the word "district," as used in Proposition 218, serves as the geo-
graphical medium which defines the area of properties whose special benefit
justifies the imposition of the assessment.
In sum, despite a lack of clarity in drafting, this definition and the use of the
term throughout the procedural requirements contained in Section 4 indicate that
Proposition 218 requires the formation of a district as a condition precedent to the
levy of an assessment. 376 In accord with Bolen, this assures that any challenge to the
assessment provisions of Proposition 218 will be analyzed not under Reynolds, but
under the local government exception as defined by Salyer and Ball. The reason
for this, as the Bolen court asserted, is because "assessment districts lack virtually
any of the incidents of government ... " and are "little more than formalistic...
372. Id. § 4(g) (emphasis added).
373. Id. § 4(a) (emphasis added).
374. Id. § 2(d).
375. See supra Part V.A (discussing the centrality of the requirement of special benefits to assessed property
under Proposition 218).
376. At the very least, the language of Section 4(e) and the definition of "district" would seem to authorize the
formation of a district before an assessment is levied, even though it may not require that one be created. If this were
the case, there might be a valid One-Person, One-Vote challenge if a local government exercising general
governmental powers levied an assessment without first creating a district. That is, since the existence of districts
appeared to be the dispositive issue in Bolen. and since, in this hypothetical scenario there is no district, we would
assume that the Reynolds principle applies. After all, the Bolen court did suggest that the SCRTD was the type of
governmental body that exercised general powers. See Southem Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Bolen. I Cal. 4th 654,
670, 822 P.2d 875, 884, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843. 852 (1992) (noting that "[the transit district itself, of course, is invested
with and exercises substantial governmental powers."). But it instead chose to draw the line based on the assessment
districts it had levied.
This scenario should underscore the artificiality of the line drawn by the Bolen court between the assessment
districts and the governing bodies which create them. If we could find a scenario like the one envisioned above, then
at least if the courts stick to precedent (which the jump from Kramer to Salver and then Ball indicates has not been
done in this area of law) we have a valid One-Person. One-Vote claim. On the other hand, if the local government first
created a district before levying an assessment, we do not have a valid One-Person. One-Vote claim. This distinction
is really nothing more than form over substance.
Whether the One-Person, One-Vote Doctrine is implicated by Proposition 218 should not turn on whether the
assessment is first levied by a district. The essential factor should be that Proposition 218 creates a "one-size-fits-all"
standard for every local government in California. Instead, applying the Bolen rationale, we have to treat a small park
district the same as we would treat the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors.
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perimeters whose raison d'etre is to serve as the conceptual medium for the
recognition of economic benefits conferred." ' For this reason, they are not the type
of governmental units implicated by the strict demands of the Kramer, Cipriano,
and Kolodziejski line of cases.
b. Are Property Owners Disproportionately Affected by Assessment
Proceedings Conducted in Accord With Proposition 218?
The next criterion of the Salyer/Ball formulation requires the determination of
whether Proposition 218 empowers only those individuals disproportionately
affected by special assessments to vote on the assessments. A plausible argument
stands to be made that those leasing property who are not responsible for property
taxes are interested in elections conducted under Proposition 218 because of pass-
through taxation. But it should be remembered that Professor Briffault has
characterized this criterion of the Salyer/Ball test as tautological .38 A pass-through
argument would not drive the analysis, he argues, rather its relevancy would either
be accepted or rejected based on the court's preference.379 The same is true for any
other interests we would put forth in defense of the right of non-property owners to
vote. Because of the circular nature of this criterion, the real analysis under the
One-Person, One-Vote Doctrine lies not here, but under the governmental powers
criterion. Salyer, Ball and Bolen make clear that once a court has concluded that
a government is one which is limited in purpose, it will almost inevitably find that
the activities of such governments disproportionately affect property owners vis-a-
vis non-property owners. In this regard, analysis under this criterion really collapses
into the analysis of the first criterion. If a court does not believe a government is
one which exercises general powers, it is unlikely to be persuaded that non-property
owners are sufficiently interested in the outcome of elections. Conversely, if a court
finds that a government is one which does exercise general powers; it will likely
accept the argument that non-property owners are sufficiently interested in the
outcome of elections as in Kramer, Cipriano and Kolodziejski.
Assuming, therefore, that a court would conclude that Proposition 218 impli-
cates governments exercising general governmental powers, the argument against
Proposition 218 under this criterion of the analysis is far less persuasive than that
made against the scheme upheld in Bolen. This is because Proposition 218
significantly narrows the scope of improvements which local governments may now
finance through special assessments. Under the new requirements, only special
benefits to property are assessable and special benefits are calculated on a strict
377. Bolen, I Cal. 4th at 669, 822 P.2d at 883, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 851.
378. See supra notes 322-25 and accompanyingtext (discussing Professor Brifault's labeling of the "primarily
interested" criterion as circular).
379. See sipra notes 322-25 and accompanying text (explaining Professor Briffault's argument in this regard).
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basis of proportionality.380 No such requirements existed at the time the court
upheld the scheme in Bolen.381
As discussed in Parts III and V, the power of local agencies to levy assessments
was not so strictly confined before Proposition 218.382 Local governments could
assess property for general as well as special benefits. 383 In contrast, the Legislative
Analyst's Office notes that the new special benefit requirements under Proposition
218 "will mean that programs that benefit people, rather than specific properties-
such as libraries, mosquito abatement, recreation programs, police protection, and
some business improvement programs-must be financed by general or special taxes
or by other nonassessment revenues."3 ' These new requirements prevent local
agencies from imposing what the drafters of Proposition 218 believe have become
parcel taxes. 385 Bolstered by court decisions holding that Proposition 13's tax
limitation and voter approval requirements did not apply to assessments, they assert
that local governments turned to assessments not just for the purpose of recovering
the cost of the special benefits to the property assessed, but for financing general
public benefits as well. Using the terminology of the Legislative Analyst's Office,
this meant that prior law allowed local governments to assess property for "pro-
grams that benefit[ed] people, rather than specific properties.'3 6
Proposition 218 puts an end to this. Whereas before, the public may have been
able to claim an interest in the type of improvements that local governments could
finance through assessments, the restrictive definition of special benefits and the
strict requirement of proportionality under Proposition 218 have likely cut off any
equivalent public interest under the new assessment requirements.38 7 In Bolen, the
court had little trouble concluding that the property owners enfranchised by the
transportation assessment scheme there were decidedly more interested than those
not enfranchised. 88 But the scheme upheld by the Bolen court did not have special
benefit requirements as restrictive as those under Proposition 218. That is, the
SCRTD scheme did not contain the same narrow definition of special benefits and
strict requirement of proportionality as does Proposition 218. This means that under
380. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text (explaining this requirement of Proposition 218).
381. CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 4(a).
382. See supra Part 1lI.B.I (noting that there is no strict requirement of proportionality under traditional special
assessment law); Part V.A.l (explaining the ways in which Proposition 218 narrows the traditional definition of
special benefits).
383. See HILL, supra note 191, at 24-25 (noting that Proposition 218 represents a major shift from prior
assessment law, "when local governments could recoup from assessments the costs of providing both general and
special benefits").
384. Id. at 33.
385. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing the argument by the drafters of Proposition 218
that assessment law prior to Proposition 13 allowed local governments to impose parcel taxes).
386. HILL, supra note 191. at 33 (emphasis added).
387. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII D. § 4(a) (providing that only special benefits to assessed property are assess-
able and requiring that assessments be proportionally levied to the amount of benefit received by each property).
388. See Bolcu. I Cal. 4th at 674-75, 822 P.2d at 887. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855 (noting that the court believed
"that recognition of the indirect and secondary effect on [those not enfranchised under the SCRTD scheme] smacks
too much of 'house that Jack built' casuistry to support constitutional determinations").
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Proposition 218, the threshold between the interests of the public and the interests
of those owning property has widened since Bolen. Thus, it follows that if the
California Supreme Court easily concluded that this criterion of the Salyer/Ball
formulation was met in Bolen, it would have even less trouble concluding that this
criterion would be met in a challenge to Proposition 218.
In sum, neither this criterion nor the general governmental powers criterion
require that Proposition 218 adhere to the strict demands of the One-Person, One-
Vote Doctrine. Instead, the exception to the doctrine as defined by Salyer and Ball
would apply to any challenge made against the new assessment approval provisions.
2. Equal Protection Analysis Under the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
Because the Salyer/Ball analysis leads to the conclusion that the local govern-
ment exception to the One-Person, One-Vote Doctrine would apply, any challenge
to Proposition 218's assessment approval provisions would have to proceed under
the rational basis test.389 Under this relaxed standard of review, a court would be
concerned only with whether the new assessment voting requirements are not
"wholly irrelevant" to the objectives Proposition 218 seeks to further."g Under this
analysis,
[t]he question whether the voting classification meets that coihstitutional
standard is one that we examine in the abstract; it is not whether we would
authorize the same exclusions were we the Legislature, but whether 'any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify' a voting scheme
limiting the franchise to owners of record of . . .real property located
within the benefit districts. 391
The purpose of Proposition 218 was to stop "politicians' end-runs around Pro-
position 13.,,392 Dubbed the "Right to Vote on Taxes Act," its drafters sought to
reverse the principal decisions of County of Fresno v. Mahnstrom393 and Solvang
Municipal Improvement District v. Board of Supervisors,394 which, in their
opinion, created "loopholes" in California's landmark tax-revolt initiative.39 Prior
to Proposition 218, majority protest procedures under traditional special assessment
law were difficult to invoke.396 Local governments could therefore impose
assessments to circumvent the tax limitation and voter approval requirements of
389. See supra note 260 (explaining the rational basis test in contrast to the strict scrutiny test).
390. Bolen, I Cal. 4th at 675, 822 P.2d at 888, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856.
391. Id. at 675-76, 822 P.2d at 888, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856.
392. 1996 VOTER PAMPHLET, supra note 32, at 76.
393. 94 Cal. App. 3d 974, 156 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1979).
394. 112 Cal. App. 3d 545, 169 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1980).
395. 1996 VOTER PAMPHLET, supra note 32, at 76.
396. See supra Part III.C.3 (explaining traditional majority protest provisions).
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Proposition 13 with little notice or objection.3 7 In contrast, the right to vote under
Proposition 218 is automatic. 39' All proposed assessments must first be sent to
property owners for approval or disapproval. 39 In this regard, the ability to use
special assessments as a loophole to Proposition 13 has been eliminated. The voting
requirement of Proposition 218 is thus rationally related to ensuring that the
principle of Proposition 13 is not ignored.
Still, it must be shown that enfranchising only property owners furthers the
interest of eliminating the assessment loophole to Proposition 13. This can be done
by noting that Proposition 218's narrow definition of special benefits and strict
requirement of proportionality dovetail nicely with the requirement that only
property owners be allowed to vote on assessments. 400 Taken together, these
provisions stand for the proposition that, because nothing more than the precise
special benefit to property may be assessed, no one other than those who benefit
may vote. Put another way, there is no reason to enfranchise non-property owners
since, by definition, they receive no benefits from an assessment. While this argu-
ment may be disputed, "in the abstract," at least, it is reasonable. That is all that is
required under rational basis review.
VII. CONCLUSION
Proposition 218 is a radical departure from traditional special assessment law.
Yet, in a state where voters continue to adhere to notions of a tax "revolt" it is an
understandable departure. This is because special assessments became a unique
breed after the passage of Proposition 13. While their longstanding legal distinction
from taxation could still be invoked, they had, in reality, become a mechanism for
circumventing the anti-taxation provisions of Proposition 13. While California
courts could plausibly argue that assessments and taxes were different as a legal
matter, no public officials could make the same argument while keeping a straight
face. Viewed in this respect, Proposition 218 is merely an extension of Proposition
13. It is based on the premise that if politicians cannot be trusted with property
taxes, they should not be trusted with special assessments. Either device,
unchecked, allows local governments to impose (the perceived) wasteful and
excessive charges upon property owners.
397. Ellingwood, supra note 357. at Al. Joel Fox. President of the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association
states, "[a]ssessment districts were so arcane [under prior law]. taxpayers never knew they existed." Id.
398. See CAL. CONST. art. XIU1 D. § 4(d) (requiring that a ballot be provided to all property owners within a
district to be assessed); id. § 4(e) (providing that an agency "shall consider all protests" to a proposed assessment):
id. (stating that a majority protest exists if the weighted ballots against a proposed assessment exceed those in favor).
399. Id. § 4(d).
400. See id. § 4(a) (providing that only special benefits to assessed property are assessable and requiring
assessments to be levied in proportion to the special benefits to property): id. § 4(g) (declaring that "because only
special benefits are assessable, electors residing within the district who do not own property within the district shall
not be deemed ... to have been deprived of the right to vote for any assessment.").
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The only way to properly attack Proposition 218 is to address the very roots of
the initiative. This, of course, means attacking Proposition 13. With the passage of
Proposition 218 coming some twenty years after the passage of Proposition 13,
however, it is hard these days to even question the hallmark anti-tax initiative. As
a member of the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association has put it, "no politician in
his right mind takes on Prop. 13 directly."' ' Thus, so long as Californians believe
it is wise to impose shackles on the taxing power of government, restrictions on the
assessment power are not only understandable, but maybe even defensible.
As to the issue Proposition 218 raises regarding the right to vote, the Bolen
opinion makes clear that instead of real analysis, the California Supreme Court will
determine voting rights based on the artificial distinction between assessment
districts and the governments which impose them.' 2 Justice Kennard's criticism of
the Bolen majority in this regard is quite on point.' 3 It is difficult to rationalize the
fact that large governments can avoid the strict requirements of the One-Person,
One-Vote Doctrine by simply creating assessment districts. This ability is entirely
contrary to the initial underpinnings of the doctrine, as set forth by the opinions in
Hadley, Avery and Kramer, all of which were particularly skeptical of attempts to
dilute or selectively distribute the franchise.' Unfortunately, the Bolen rationale,
when applied in the context of Proposition 218, will only make things worse.
Proposition 218 adopts a one-size-fits-all approach by making its provisions
applicable to every local government in the state. 4° If, as this Comment suggests,
the initiative requires the formation of assessment districts before assessments may
be levied, then neither the size nor nature of local governments will ever be
relevant to the analysis. That is, county boards of supervisors as well as the tiniest
park district alike will be insulated from attack when voting rights are at issue. One
must question the wisdom of this anomalous result.
401. Martin, supra note 24, at 15.
402. See supra Part VI.B (discussing the rationale employed in the Bolen opinion).
403. See supra notes 345-49 and accompanying text (explaining this criticism).
404. See supra Part Vl.A.2.a-b (analyzing these cases).
405. See supra note 360 and accompanying text (setting forth the definition ot "local government" under
Proposition 218).
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